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Gilchrist: Individual Accountability for Corporate Crime

INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
CORPORATE CRIME
Gregory M. Gilchrist
ABSTRACT
Corporate crime is too often addressed by fining the corporation,
leaving the real people who committed the crime facing no
consequence at all. This failure to hold individuals accountable in
cases of corporate malfeasance generates an accountability gap that
undermines deterrence and introduces expressive costs. Facing
heightened criticism of this trend, then-Deputy Attorney General
Sally Yates issued a policy designed to generate prosecutions of real
people in cases of corporate wrongdoing. The policy reflects a strong
and continuing demand for more prosecutions of individuals in the
corporate context.
This Article contends that the effort to introduce accountability by
increasing prosecutions against individuals, while understandable and
responsive to a real problem, is bound to fail in two distinct ways.
First, it will fail as a procedural matter by systematically punishing
lower-level corporate employees. Second, it will fail as a normative
matter by systematically punishing based on overbroad and unclear
laws.
Identifying these procedural and normative failings lends new
clarity to the nature of the accountability gap. The popular anger
toward corporate management is often predicated on blame for
recklessness and greed, rather than blame for violating positive law.
As such, the anger is neither irrational nor inconsequential; however,
it is directed toward a kind of culpability that is a poor fit for criminal
law. The accountability gap must be addressed, but in most instances
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of corporate misconduct, civil liability represents the best mechanism
for holding people accountable.
INTRODUCTION
The last decade brought repeated and frequent bad news from the
world’s greatest, most powerful, and most revered corporations.
Stories of abuse, misconduct, and crime within these elite and
critically important institutions greet us on a near-daily basis. The
legal system does a poor job governing corporate conduct. It ought to
do better.
That there is too much corporate crime is not news. The question
remains how to address it. Some degree of fraud was almost surely
an element of the financial crisis;1 in the years since, banks have paid
staggering fines,2 but senior bankers have been neither jailed nor
even prosecuted.3 This trend extends beyond the financial crisis to
financial institutions more generally. A global bank systematically
failed to prevent money laundering by narco-terrorist organizations,4
1. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 15–16 (2011)
(describing various frauds that contributed to the financial crisis). There is important disagreement about
whether prosecutors had or could have generated evidence of specific frauds necessary to support
prosecutions. Compare Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been
Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financialcrisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/ (expressing skepticism about government claims that there may
have been no fraud), with Daniel C. Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 265,
268 (2014) (noting that the macro-level conclusions of the Financial Inquiry Commission bear little
relation to the sorts of specific evidence needed to support specific charges). The point here is smaller
and entirely macro: fraudulent conduct in the financial sector almost certainly contributed to the crisis.
See generally MARY KREINER RAMIREZ & STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, THE CASE FOR THE CORPORATE
DEATH PENALTY: RESTORING LAW AND ORDER ON WALL STREET xi (2017).
2. See Christina Rexrode & Emily Glazer, Big Banks Paid $110 Billion in Mortgage-Related Fines.
Where Did the Money Go?, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 9, 2016, 4:07 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bigbanks-paid-110-billion-mortgage-related-fines-where-did-the-money-go-1457557442 (reviewing fines
totaling $110 billion paid by Bank of America Corp., J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Citigroup Inc., Wells
Fargo & Co., Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs Group Inc. “for their role in inflating a mortgage
bubble that helped cause the financial crisis”).
3. Todd Haugh, The Most Senior Wall Street Official: Evaluating the State of Financial Crisis
Prosecutions, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 153, 168 (2015); RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, supra note 1, at 1.
4. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank USA N.A. Admit
to Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations, Forfeit $1.256 Billion in Deferred Prosecution
Agreement (Dec. 11, 2012) [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Justice, HSBC Press Release],
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pharmaceutical companies marketed products for purposes
unapproved by the FDA,5 and an auto manufacturer concealed a
safety defect from regulators that allegedly contributed to 124
deaths.6 In each case, the entity paid headline-generating fines, while
the real people involved in the misconduct were not prosecuted.7
People, not companies, commit crimes, but more often than not,
companies, not people, pay the price.
This emphasis on entity-level liability is problematic. Although
there are good reasons to hold organizations qua organizations
accountable, doing so is insufficient as a matter of deterrence and
expressive justice. And the failure to hold bad actors accountable has
not gone unnoticed; indeed, some have even pointed to the failure to
prosecute individuals in the wake of the financial crisis as a factor in
the recent shift toward populism among the electorate.8
Entity-level criminal liability is an unusual and unwieldy
construct. An organization violates an external norm when, and only
when,9 one or more of its agents violates that norm.10 Criticisms of
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-crm-1478.html.
5. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to
Resolve Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report Safety Data (July 2, 2012) [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, GlaxoSmithKline Press Release], https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/glaxosmithkline-plead-guiltyand-pay-3-billion-resolve-fraud-allegations-and-failure-report.
6. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Criminal Charges
Against General Motors and Deferred Prosecution Agreement with $900 Million Forfeiture (Sept. 17,
2015),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-criminal-chargesagainst-general-motors-and-deferred [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Justice, General Motors Press Release];
see also Critics Rip GM Deferred Prosecution Agreement in Engine Switch Case, CORP. CRIME REP.
(Sept. 17, 2015, 10:53 AM), https://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/critics-rip-gm-deferredprosecution-in-switch-case/.
7. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, GlaxoSmithKline Press Release, supra note 5; U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
HSBC Press Release, supra note 4; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, General Motors Press Release, supra note 6.
8. See Gretchen Morgenson, How Letting Bankers Off the Hook May Have Tipped the Election,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/13/business/how-letting-bankers-offthe-hook-may-have-tipped-the-election.html (“There are many facets to the populist, anti-establishment
anger that swept Donald J. Trump into the White House in Tuesday’s election. A crucial element fueling
the rage, in my view, was this: Not one high-ranking executive at a major financial firm was held to
account for the crisis of 2008.”); see also Ryan Cooper, 2009: The Year the Democratic Party Died,
THE WEEK (Nov. 15, 2016), http://theweek.com/articles/661871/2009-year-democratic-party-died.
9. In some circuits there can be minor exceptions to this statement because of the collective
knowledge doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987).
10. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909) (“Applying the
principle governing civil liability, we go only a step farther in holding that the act of the agent, while
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applying criminal law to entities are manifold, but the simplest
critique is that entity-level liability punishes the wrong people: the
pain of the penalty is visited primarily on innocent parties, such as
shareholders.11 The real people who committed the wrong generally
remain unpunished.12 This accountability gap undermines retributive
justice and general deterrence.13 Moreover, expressively, the public is
left with the devastating impression that elites are immune from
punishment.14
The dominant response has been a call, both formal and informal,
to more aggressively prosecute the individuals involved with
corporate malfeasance. The Yates Memo represents a formal iteration
of this response; it alters certain policies governing prosecutorial
discretion in an effort to generate more individual criminal
prosecutions.15 The specifics of the Yates Memo are a response to the
demand that the legal system do more to hold individuals
accountable.16 Yates, of course, is no longer with the Department of
Justice (DOJ),17 and the status of any prosecutorial policy is subject
to change. This issue, however, is not going away.18 The urgency of
exercising the authority delegated to him to make rates for transportation, may be controlled, in the
interest of public policy, by imputing his act to his employer and imposing penalties upon the
corporation for which he is acting in the premises.”).
11. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 401 (1981).
12. Haugh, supra note 3, at 157.
13. Id. at 159.
14. See, e.g., Critics Rip GM Deferred Prosecution Agreement in Engine Switch Case, supra note 6
(“GM killed over a [sic] 100 people by knowingly putting a defective ignition switch into over one
million vehicles . . . [y]et no one from GM went to jail or was even charged with criminal
homicide. . . . Today thanks to its lobbyists, GM officials walk off scot free while its customers are six
feet under.”).
15. See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. Sally Quillian Yates to All U.S. Attorneys et al. 2
(Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download [hereinafter Yates Memo].
16. See, e.g., Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the New York
City
Bar
Association
White
Collar
Crime
Conference
(May
6,
2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-sally-q-yates-delivers-remarks-new-yorkcity-bar-association (“We cannot have a different system of justice–or the perception of a different
system of justice–for corporate executives than we do for everyone else.”).
17. Rebecca Savransky, Loretta Lynch Praises Sally Yates for “Courageous Leadership,” THE HILL
(Jan. 31, 2017, 1:41 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/317136-loretta-lynch-praisessally-yates-for-courageous-leadership.
18. Indeed, enforcement trends suggest the emphasis on individual accountability has not been
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the accountability gap is real; the status quo is unsatisfactory; and the
demand for individual accountability is appropriate and likely to
continue in any political climate. However, the understandable
response that calls for more aggressive prosecutions of individuals is
misguided and potentially dangerous. Emphasizing more individual
prosecutions in the corporate context will inevitably trend toward
prosecuting relatively low-level employees, and away from the rule
of law.
This Article identifies two distinct challenges that necessarily
confront any call for more individual prosecutions in the corporate
context. First, incentivizing individual prosecutions fails as a
procedural matter by systematically punishing lower-level corporate
employees. Second, the effort is normatively flawed because it
systematically punishes based on overbroad and unclear laws. To
develop these arguments, this Article relies on both jurisprudential
literature on the nature and function of criminal law as well as
concrete examples of corporate misconduct and the criminal process.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the need for a
change by illustrating the deterrent and expressive failures of the
status quo that emphasizes entity-level accountability too often
without attending to individual bad actors. Part II illustrates the
inevitable failures of remedying the shortcomings of the status quo
by enhancing individual prosecutions, and isolates two distinct types
of failure: first, as a matter of procedure and corporate organization,
such efforts will disproportionately impact lower-level employees;
second, as a matter of substantive law, such efforts will create greater
tension with the rule of law and undermine respect for the law. Part
III suggests that civil liability represents a second-best option for
remedying the shortcomings of the present approach, succeeding

merely cosmetic. See Helen Chandler-Wilde, Finance Regulators Target Executives in Accountability
Shift, Secs. L. Daily (BNA) (Aug. 1, 2017) (“Executives faced four times as many financial misconduct
probes by enforcement agencies in the U.K., U.S. and Hong Kong as firms did last year following the
introduction of programs to hold individuals accountable, according to a report by New York-based
corporate finance advisers Duff & Phelps.”).
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where an emphasis on criminal law would fail, and mitigating the
flaws of the status quo.
We need greater accountability for misconduct within
organizations. Failure to address this problem will further undermine
public trust in the law. But the answer does not lie in criminal law.
Civil penalties can establish individual accountability where criminal
law has failed. Laws establishing civil liability already exist but are
too often ignored. Civil penalties for individuals are not perfect, but
they represent a second-best option that can mitigate the deterrent
and expressive harms associated with the status quo.
I. Entity-Level Accountability Is Necessary, but Not Sufficient
Traditionally, the criminal law did not apply to entities. There were
serious questions about whether it would even make sense to subject
an organization to criminal liability.19 Today, however, it is well
settled (at least outside academia) that it is appropriate to hold
corporations criminally liable.20 The law has been clear for more than
a century: a corporation can be held criminally accountable for the
acts its agents commit in the scope of their agency and on behalf of
the corporation.21
The Supreme Court accepted entity-level criminal liability with
little thought or discussion. The New York Central & Hudson River
Railroad v. United States decision is commonly identified as the first
application of broad criminal liability to corporations.22 The case is
19. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 464 (1765). Blackstone
claimed it was impossible. See id. (“A corporation cannot commit treason, or felony, or other crime, in
its corporate capacity.”); see also Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability:
Seeking a Consistent Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in Criminal Prosecutions,
63 TENN. L. REV. 793, 808 (1996) (“The classic view of the corporation’s potential criminal liability, as
expressed by Blackstone, was that a corporation could not be held liable for a crime, although individual
members could be punished for corporate acts.”).
20. See, e.g., Robert E. Bloch, Compliance Programs and Criminal Antitrust Litigation: A
Prosecutor’s Perspective, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 223, 227 (1988) (“It has long been established that under a
federal statute like the Sherman Act, a corporation may be held criminally liable for the acts and
declarations of its officers, employees, and agents performed within the scope of their actual or apparent
authority.”).
21. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 212 U.S. at 495.
22. Id. This was not the first time a corporation was held criminally liable, but it is the case generally

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol34/iss2/2

6

Gilchrist: Individual Accountability for Corporate Crime

2018]

INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CORPORATE CRIME

341

remarkable for its brevity and lack of analysis. Pam Bucy described
the opinion as suffering from “three major flaws”: “failure to
appreciate the inherently different nature of civil and criminal law”;
“failure to consider the civil alternatives to corporate criminal
liability”; and “failure to examine the alternative standards for
imposing criminal liability upon corporations.”23 Bucy offers cogent
criticism; the opinion does suffer from these deficiencies, and the
first is the most problematic. Indeed, the very rationale for imposing
criminal liability on corporations is nothing more than the
observation that entities are responsible for their agents’ actions in
the civil sphere.24 Whether and why this principle ought to extend
into the criminal realm remains entirely unaddressed in this brief and
significant opinion.
Although criticism of the Court’s rationale for corporate criminal
liability is widespread, scholars diverge on the ultimate question of
whether corporations should be subject to criminal liability. Some
have described entity-level criminal liability as inefficient and
possibly purposeless,25 and sometimes irrational and nonsensical.26
Others, including myself, have argued that corporate criminal
liability does serve a function, and although precise formulations and
rationales differ, most arguing in favor of corporate criminal liability
do so because it has an expressive component that matters.27

identified with establishing a doctrine of corporate criminal liability. See, e.g., United States v. Van
Schaick, 134 F. 592, 593 (1904); see also Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Expressive Cost of Corporate
Immunity, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 4 n.14 (2012).
23. See Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability,
75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1114–15 (1991).
24. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 212 U.S. at 494 (explaining that “[a]pplying the
principle governing civil liability, we go only a step farther in holding that the act of the agent, while
exercising the authority delegated to him to make rates for transportation,” can render the principle
corporation criminally liable).
25. See, e.g., V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1477, 1499 (1996).
26. See Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1373 (2009).
27. See, e.g., David M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings: Reconsidering Corporate Criminal
Prosecution, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1235 (2016); Gilchrist, supra note 23, at 1; Samuel W. Buell,
The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 473 (2006).
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We ought to punish corporations qua corporations because the
failure to do so fosters the dangerous message that corporations may
price criminal conduct.28 Criminal law is special in that it entails a
component of social condemnation.29 Corporations suffer none of the
more dramatic bodily or psychological traumas routinely visited on
real persons convicted of crimes; by removing even the societal
expression of moral condemnation inherent in a criminal conviction,
we leave corporations in a fundamentally different position relative
to criminal law. For persons, the expression inherent in substantive
criminal law is “thou shalt not . . . .”30 If corporations are subject only
to civil penalties, the message is that everything is permitted, albeit
priced.31 This is contrary to the nature and purpose of criminal codes,
and it remains the best justification for imposing criminal liability on
corporations.
Entity-level liability is therefore necessary; it is not, however,
sufficient. By itself, it fails to deter future wrongdoing, and too much
reliance on entity-level liability introduces new expressive costs.

28. Gilchrist, supra note 22, at 7 (“Immunizing corporations from prosecution would present its own
symbolism: Namely, corporations may violate criminal laws if they are willing to pay for it. Corporate
crime would thus be little more than a menu of harms and prices.”). Of course, not all substantive
offenses are alike, and insider trading and securities fraud more generally raise some distinctive issues
that make entity-level liability less attractive. Generally, firms are not prosecuted for illegal trading by
their employees. See Howard J. Kaplan, Corporate Criminal Liability for Insider Trading, Securities
Litigation,
A.B.A.
(Dec.
4,
2014),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/securities/articles/fall2014-1114-corporate-criminalliability-insider-trading.html (“Although insider traders often work for business entities, their employers
are rarely held criminally liable for their acts.”). For a comprehensive analysis of the reasons entity
liability fails normatively and as a deterrent in most fraud on the market civil cases, see Jennifer H.
Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence,
1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 703 (1992). Fraud on the market is distinctive in that the set of victims will
include the firm and other shareholders, and there is good reason to believe that the fraud stems from
agency costs as managers act to protect themselves against poor performance. Id. at 702–03. Although
Arlen and Carney are directly addressing firm-level civil liability, much of their analysis could be
echoed for criminal liability in the securities context.
29. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 405
(1958) (“[Crime] is conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place, will incur a formal and solemn
pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community.”).
30. John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 225 (1991).
31. Id. at 195–96.
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A. Insufficient Deterrence
By any measure, deterrence is a central function of criminal law.
Criminal law catalogues forbidden conduct, and by criminalizing
conduct, society reduces the incidence of the conduct.32 There are
important questions about the mechanisms by which, and the degree
to which, deterrence works.33 Yet few would deny that criminalizing
conduct deters that conduct to some degree.34
Entity-level enforcement actions, however, are of particularly
limited deterrent value for two reasons. First, in many cases, it is
impossible to set entity-level penalties high enough to deter rational,
wealth-maximizing conduct.35 Deterrence theory tends to be modeled
on a simplistic economic approach to decision-making. In its most
basic formulation, deterrence theory turns on imposing a cost that,
even when discounted by the chance that conduct will go undetected
or unpunished, outweighs the benefit to the person or entity deciding
whether to engage in the conduct.36 For example, a corporation that
secures a bid through bribery will be deterred only if the value it
perceives in the winning bid is less than the penalty for bribery,
discounted by the chance the bribery would remain unpunished.
Since most corporate criminal conduct remains undetected, the
32. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2386 (1997)
(describing deterrence, albeit skeptically, as the “grand unified theory” of criminal law).
33. See id. (explaining “the ways in which the deterrence question is more difficult than many of us
have assumed and illustrates how criminalization can create unintended, and sometimes perverse,
incentives”); see also Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation
of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 953 (2003) (explaining
effective deterrence requires, at a minimum, notice, a perceived consequence greater than the perceived
benefit of violation, and the ability to comport one’s behavior to rational standards, and cautioning that
social science literature provides strong reasons to be skeptical about each of these).
34. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 33, at 951 (“There seems little doubt that having a criminal
justice system that punishes violators, as every organized society does, has the general effect of
influencing the conduct of potential offenders.”); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02, Explanatory
Note (identifying “the dominant theme [for the framework governing the definition of offenses] is the
prevention of offenses”).
35. See Coffee, supra note 11, at 390 (“[T]he maximum meaningful fine that can be levied against
any corporate offender is necessarily bounded by its wealth.”).
36. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193,
1209 (1985) (“[T]he murderer will not be comparing the gain from the crime with the loss if he is
caught and sentenced; he will be comparing it with the disutility of the sentence discounted by the
probability that it will actually be imposed.”).
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discount rate is necessarily high.37 The problem with applying this
model to corporations is that corporations are frequently judgmentproof to the penalties theoretically required to adequately deter
wrongdoing. Corporations can only be compelled to pay what they
have.38 Accordingly, a company’s wealth limits the punishment.39
For a company that would be ruined by a million-dollar fine, there is
no difference between a potential fine of $1 million and a potential
fine of $100 million. Both pose existential threats. If the deterrence
calculus necessitates a fine beyond what a company can pay,
deterrence falters.
The second deterrence failure of entity-only liability might be
described as an agency cost,40 or a fundamental component of the
separation of ownership from control.41 The only way for a
corporation to act, or to commit a crime, is through its agents.42
Generally, punishing the corporation involves imposing a fine and
other remedial conditions.43 But whatever the form, any punishment
of the corporation is reducible to money. And the money comes
primarily from the owners of the corporation.44 The line between
ownership and control of the corporation is the fundamental
challenge for every component of corporate governance, and in this
case the division is stark. Control violated the law, and ownership
pays for that violation.
A corporation functions through the actions of its board, officers,
employees, and other agents.45 These real people making decisions
37. Id.
38. Coffee, supra note 11, at 390.
39. Id.
40. See Christopher R. Leslie, Cartels, Agency Costs, and Finding Virtue in Faithless Agents, 49
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1621, 1635 (2008) (“[A]gency costs include any losses the principal suffers
because his agent pursues her own goals.”); see also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308
(1976).
41. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 40, at 309.
42. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943) (“[T]he only way in which a corporation
can act is through the individuals who act on its behalf.”).
43. See generally Coffee, supra note 11, at 386–87.
44. See id. at 401.
45. See Elizabeth E. Joh & Thomas W. Joo, The Corporation As Snitch: The New DOJ Guidelines
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about corporate conduct have their own agendas, rationales,
incentives, and risk tolerances.46 Paying a bribe to secure a contract
the firm values at $1 million is not worth it to the corporation if there
is a ten percent chance that paying the bribe will result in a $20
million dollar fine. However, the corporation does not decide
whether to pay the bribe; a corporate agent does. That agent—maybe
a national manager who is concerned she will lose out on a bonus or
promotion if she fails to meet a looming target—faces entirely
different considerations.
Sometimes the complexity of modern corporate conduct
overwhelms the imagination. Simplicity clarifies. The piracy case
Harmony v. United States against the brig Malek Adhel nicely
illustrates the fundamental agency problem with using entity-level
liability as a deterrent.47 During the summer of 1840, this cargo ship,
captained by Joseph Nunez, set sail from New York to Guayamas,
California (now Mexico).48 The journey quickly got off course.49
Although the court records are limited, they make clear that a
planned mercantile voyage transformed over the summer into an
oddly inept sort of piracy.50 The court case does not clarify why or
how the captain engaged in this conduct, but it does conclusively
establish two key facts. First, the ship was engaged in acts of
piracy.51 Second, the owners of the ship “never contemplated or
authorized” the piratical acts.52
Notwithstanding their uncontested innocence, the owners were
punished. Their ship was seized by the United States for its violation
of the Act of March 3, 1819, ch.75, “to protect the commerce of the
on Prosecuting White Collar Crime, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 51, 55 (2015) (explaining corporations
“can act only through its human agents”).
46. See Coffee, supra note 11, at 394–95; see also Ian B. Lee, Corporate Criminal Responsibility as
Team Member Responsibility, 31 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 755, 758 (2011).
47. See Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. 210, 222 (1844).
48. Id. at 230.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 212–20 (deposition of John Myers, acting first mate).
51. Id. at 232.
52. Id. at 230.
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United States, and to punish the crime of piracy.”53 Reviewing the
seizure, the Court concluded that the owners’ innocence was
immaterial.54 The statute provided for action against any vessel
involved in acts of piracy; the Malek Adhel was involved in acts of
piracy, and therefore seizure was appropriate.55 Tellingly, the Court
wrote, “[t]he vessel which commits the aggression is treated as the
offender, as the guilty instrument or thing to which the forfeiture
attaches, without any reference whatsoever to the character or
conduct of the owner.”56
The analogy is not perfect, because this is not a case involving a
corporation and the case involves forfeiture, piracy, and even a
reference to the lawless status hostis humani generis.57 It is plainly
distinguishable from modern corporate criminal cases. The lesson,
however, is clear: the law does sometimes permit action against a
thing, and the harm that action causes to the innocent owners of the
thing does not prevent the action.
The Harmony case offers three justifications for inflicting a
financial penalty on the innocent owners. First, the action is against
the vessel, not the owners, and their harm is incidental.58 Although
supported by history, this formalistic division between in rem and in
personam actions is unlikely to satisfy any but the most arcane
readers.59 Second, the innocence of the owners is somewhat less than
that of the victims of the piracy, and the owners’ property represents
the “best and surest pledge for the compensation and indemnity to the
injured party.”60 This second justification makes sense in the context
of a piracy forfeiture; it carries less weight in the context of a
53. Harmony, 43 U.S. at 229.
54. Id. at 233.
55. Id. at 233–34.
56. Id. at 233.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 234 (“[T]he offence is primarily attached to the thing.”).
59. Indeed, Al Alschuler leverages the absurdity of blaming a thing as part of his critique of entitylevel liability. See Alschuler, supra note 26, at 1373 (comparing imposing criminal liability on a
corporation to smashing a computer in frustration: “therapeutic, but it is not recommended for children
or for grownups”).
60. See Harmony, 43 U.S. at 234.
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corporate fine that will not directly benefit the victims of the
misconduct.61 The third justification is only hinted at; the owners,
although innocent, remain the party most capable of preventing this
conduct in the future.62 The owners never contemplated these
piratical acts, but piracy was a risk of merchant marine ventures, of
which they must have been aware. How careful was their decision to
have Joseph Nunez captain their ship? How fulsome was the
interview? Did they conduct background checks? Did their actions
meet industry best practices for evaluating risk? Maybe, after these
innocent owners forfeit their ship, future owners would exercise
greater care in choosing their captains. Maybe.
The deterrence rationale is real, but of plainly limited effect.
Particularly in the corporate context, ownership is separated from
control such that any effort to deter future misdeeds by punishing
shareholders succeeds only in the most ethereal and indirect manner.
Whether it is correct or not, one can imagine that seizing a ship
engaged in piracy might change the behavior of other ship-owners in
such a way as to reduce future acts of piracy. And, one can imagine
that when HSBC paid fines exceeding one billion dollars,63
management at that bank and other large financial institutions paid
renewed attention to Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) compliance.64 Punishing ownership
61. Although some money collected in corporate criminal fines is used to help victims, most of the
money goes to the state or federal governments involved in the investigation. See, e.g., Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Collects More Than $8 Billion in Civil and Criminal Cases in
Fiscal Year 2013 (Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-collects-more-8billion-civil-and-criminal-cases-fiscal-year-2013.
62. Harmony, 43 U.S. at 233. Forfeiture of the vessel is “the only adequate means of suppressing the
offense or wrong.” Id.
63. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, HSBC Press Release, supra note 4.
64. The compliance industry certainly continues to use the case to sell compliance products. See,
e.g., Andrew Simpson, HSBC Still Chasing AML Compliance, Even After $680 Million Spend,
CASEWARE ANALYTICS (June 1, 2016), https://www.casewareanalytics.com/blog/hsbc-still-chasingaml-compliance-even-after-680-million-spend. Whether such sanctions establish well-calibrated
compliance is debatable; for more on rent-seeking risks inherent in internalized compliance
responsibilities, see Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting
Corporate Law’s “Duty of Care As Responsibility for Systems,” 31 J. CORP. L. 949, 967 (2006)
(discussing, in the context of Sarbanes-Oxley, the incentives for both external attorneys and consultants,
as well as internal departments like “[i]nformation technology, internal audit, compliance, and legal
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can generate deterrence, but the connection between ownership and
control is sufficiently attenuated such that effective deterrence
requires unwieldy penalties, and more reasonable penalties are
unlikely to generate sufficient deterrence. In the Harmony case, the
penalty—loss of the entire vessel—was plainly out of proportion
with the scope of culpability: insufficient due diligence. A lesser
penalty would have been fairer, but it would have failed to inspire
other vessel owners to take note of the relatively small risk their
captain would turn pirate.
Entity-level penalties punish owners most directly. Owners are
poorly situated, compared with management and corporate agents, to
prevent future wrongdoing. Therefore, entity-level penalties are, at
best, an inefficient means of deterring wrongdoing. At worst, they are
an insufficient means of deterring wrongdoing.
B. Harmful Expression
Deterrence is not the only, nor is it a sufficient, reason to impose
entity-level criminal liability.65 Punishing the entity serves an
important expressive role.66 Indeed, the expressive cost of
systematically failing to hold entities criminally liable is a necessary
component justifying corporate criminal liability.67 Absent the
possibility of holding corporations criminally liable, the legal system
sends a message that criminal conduct is merely priced, not
forbidden, when engaged in on behalf of a corporation. This message
is at odds with social norms; it is corrosive, and it threatens the
perceived legitimacy of the legal system.68

services”).
65. There is little or no deterrence secured through imposing criminal liability on a corporation that
could not be achieved equally through civil liability. See Khanna, supra note 26, at 1499 (“All of these
sanctions [most commonly associated with entity-level criminal liability] are or can easily be made
available in corporate civil liability regimes.”).
66. Gilchrist, supra note 22, at 6.
67. See id. (“[T]he most significant expressive value associated with corporate criminal liability is
the expressive cost of immunizing corporations.”).
68. Id. at 49–50.
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However, exclusively penalizing organizations for criminal
conduct introduces its own expressive cost. By failing to hold the real
people who engaged in wrongdoing accountable, the legal system
sends the dangerous message that shareholders will indemnify crimes
committed on Wall Street, while prison awaits those who commit
crimes on Main Street. I previously explored this problem in the
context of financial institutions,69 but it has a broader application.
The problem can be described as one of affirmance: the systematic
failure to punish individuals who commit crimes in the corporate
setting not only fails to condemn, it can signal the conduct’s
affirmation.70
This concern—about the dangers of treating elite crimes
differently than street crimes—has been echoed in a wide array of
fora.71 A handful of commentators have already begun to identify
public anger over this perceived double standard as a potential factor
in the recent presidential election.72 A well-functioning legal system
must be perceived as legitimate.73 The consistent failure to hold highlevel executives accountable for high-profile corporate misdeeds

69. See Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Special Problem of Banks and Crime, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 1
(2014).
70. Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Criminal Affirmance: Going Beyond the Deterrence Paradigm to
Examine the Social Meaning of Declining Prosecution of Elite Crime, 45 CONN. L. REV. 865, 871
(2013) (“[A]ffirmance stands for the proposition that not pursuing or not punishing elite crime
adequately can undermine the rule of law, diminish confidence in government, and promote further
costly criminality.”) (footnotes omitted).
71. See, e.g., Rakoff, supra note 1 (suggesting the DOJ’s failure to prosecute high-level executives
in the wake of the financial crisis risks appearing as “disregard for equality under the law”). When
caught engaged in criminal conduct, large financial institutions “all were handed the equivalent of traffic
tickets—pay a fine on your way out the door.” Robert Mazur, How to Halt the Terrorist Money Train,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/03/opinion/how-bankers-help-drugtraffickers-and-terrorists.html. Entity-level settlements have “fostered concerns that ‘too big to fail’
Wall Street banks enjoy a favored status, in statute and in enforcement policy. This perception
undermines the public’s confidence in our institutions and in the principal that the law is applied equally
in all cases.” Letter from U.S. Senators Sherrod Brown and Charles Grassley to Eric Holder, U.S.
Attorney General (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.grassley.senate.gov/about /upload/01-29-13-Letter-toHolder-on-Wall-Street-Prosecutions.pdf.
72. See Morgenson, supra note 8; Cooper, supra note 8.
73. See Gregory M. Gilchrist, Condemnation Without Basis: An Expressive Failure of Corporate
Prosecutions, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1121, 1134 (2013) (describing the relationship between the expressive
value of legal action, the perceived legitimacy of a legal system, and the functionality of that system).

Published by Reading Room, 2018

15

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 2

350

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:2

amounts to legal expressions at odds with public values and corrodes
the perceived legitimacy of the legal system.
II. Individual Prosecutions for Corporate Misconduct Cannot
Address the Accountability Gap
If entity-level liability is insufficient, it seems reasonable to call
for prosecution against the actual people who are causing the entity
to engage in misconduct.74 Banks are aiding money laundering? Go
after some bankers. Big Pharma is marketing for off-label purposes?
Prosecute some executives. Car companies are cheating on safety
measures? Lock up the C-suite. Action against senior officials would
create powerful incentives to avoid future misconduct, and it would
send an admirably clear message that criminal acts will be afforded
no more tolerance in the corridors of power than they are in West
Baltimore.
The DOJ promoted this message in 2015. Then-Deputy Attorney
General Sally Quinn Yates wrote to all federal prosecutors:
One of the most effective ways to combat corporate
misconduct is by seeking accountability from the
individuals who perpetrated the wrongdoing. Such
accountability is important for several reasons: it deters
future illegal activity, it incentivizes changes in corporate
behavior, it ensures that the proper parties are held
responsible for their actions, and it promotes the public’s
confidence in our justice system.75
The memorandum directed federal prosecutors to concentrate on
bringing criminal actions against individual wrongdoers in cases of
corporate criminality and to amend the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual
accordingly, specifically the Principles of Federal Prosecution of

74. See, e.g., Rakoff, supra note 1.
75. See Yates Memo, supra note 15, at 1.
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Business Organizations.76 Furthermore, it provided that corporations
should receive no leniency for cooperating with law enforcement
unless the company discloses “all relevant facts about individual
misconduct.”77 In this way, the memorandum not only instructs
prosecutors to concentrate on individual prosecutions, it also
incentivizes corporations to provide prosecutors the evidence they
will need to do so.
This effort, however understandable and even commendable, will
meet only the most limited success. A few executives may pay a
public price, but deterrence and expressivism will falter at the
obvious arbitrariness of punishment.78 And the vast weight of the
criminal justice system will fall mostly on lower-level personnel.
Moreover, because of the breadth and vagueness of much of the
substantive criminal law applicable in the corporate contexts, too
many individual prosecutions will be sullied by the appearance of
post hoc vengeance inconsistent with the basic principles of due
process. This Part considers each of these failures in turn.
A. The Procedural Limits of Individual Criminal Prosecutions
Individual prosecutions fall disproportionately on lower-level
corporate agents.79 This is not a circumstantial error in prosecutorial
discretion; rather, it is the predictable result of the corporate form and
the process of corporate investigations. Consequently, any policy
initiative intended to enhance the incidence of criminal prosecutions
against individuals in the corporate context will generate the greatest
impact among relatively low-level employees.
This systemic bias generates costs. Disproportionately prosecuting
lower-level employees undermines deterrence and threatens the
76. Id. at 2–3.
77. Id. at 3.
78. Richman, supra note 1, at 276 (“Unless we are careful—or are ready for a more sustained
commitment of resources—the message of a relative handful of prosecutions will be ‘a few heads will
roll when the market takes a deep dive and the public seeks retribution.’ And the target deterrence
audience will weigh the slim chance that lightning will strike them against the enormous financial gains
from continued play.”).
79. RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, supra note 1, at 7.
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perceived legitimacy of the legal system. Where the cost of crime is
paid by a subset of those responsible, deterrence suffers because
other prospective bad actors observe that most people involved in
corporate wrongdoing get away with it.80 Where senior personnel
consistently avoid being penalized for the decisions they make, there
is no general deterrence for those who are similarly situated.81
Expressively, the law appears arbitrary, if not institutionally biased,
in favor of elites.82 The perception that the law treats people
differently based on social status is at odds with the rule of law, and
it undermines trust in the legal system.83 And the perception of
differential treatment based on irrelevant factors causes these harms,
whether the perception is accurate or not. As I will address further
below, this perception in the corporate context is not entirely
accurate—because frequently the relevant factor leading to disparate
treatment is differential evidence or even differential culpability—but
the perception itself is real, harmful, and not easily overcome.
A legal system that appears to be engaged in scapegoating—or, to
use Dan Richman’s memorable phrase, “corporate headhunting”84—
scares few and appears illegitimate. The specter of prosecution
appears like the risk of shark attack: dramatic, frightful, and unlikely
to happen to you. The stories of engineers or middle managers whose
lives are overturned as they face the full arsenal of investigative and
prosecutorial weapons wielded by the DOJ resonate tragedy and
injustice.85 The public, rightfully angry at a harm caused by a
80. Id. at 8.
81. Id.
82. See David Thacher, Channeling Police Discretion: The Hidden Potential of Focused Deterrence,
2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 533, 552 (2016) (“Overinclusive laws also contribute to arbitrary punishment—
to differences in treatment that result from accidents of fate, caprice, and other morally irrelevant
factors.”).
83. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1997) (“[T]he Rule of Law should guarantee against at least some types of official
arbitrariness.”).
84. See Richman, supra note 1, at 265.
85. The pressure on the few, often-relatively-low-level, employees charged in instances of large
scale corporate misconduct is immense. One can, with a little imagination, get a glimpse of the pathos of
these cases in the recent New York Times obituary of Donald Vidrine, one of two rig supervisors
charged with manslaughter following the Deepwater Horizon disaster. See Clifford Krause, Donald J.
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corporation, finds itself unable to direct its blame at these targets.86
The legal system thus accomplishes little while seeming meanspirited, arbitrary, or wrongheaded.
Need it be so? Might not prosecutors use their broad discretion to
bring cases that avoid these problems? Probably not. The problem of
low-level targeting is largely unavoidable in our legal system, and the
phenomenon is not new. When the DOJ indicts individuals in the
corporate context, it rarely indicts senior corporate officials.87
Todd Haugh recently provided an excellent example of the
continued practice of prosecuting relatively low-level employees for
high-profile failures.88 Kareem Serageldin was prosecuted for
conspiracy to falsify books and records of a financial institution.89
Serageldin was broadly portrayed (with plenty of assistance from the
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation) as a senior Wall Street official, and
the crime was widely portrayed as importantly connected to the
United States financial crisis.90 The agency rationale for this
portrayal is clear. Following the financial crisis, there were no
prosecutions of the people responsible.91 The criticisms—some
misplaced—were strong.92 So, with Serageldin, the government had a
responsive narrative: we are prosecuting senior Wall Street officials
for wrongdoing leading to the financial crisis.

Vidrine, Supervisor on Ill-Fated Deepwater Horizon Rig, Dies at 69, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 6, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/business/energy-environment/donald-vidrine-died-deepwaterhorizon-supervisor.html.
86. See, e.g., Aruna Viswanatha, U.S. Bid to Prosecute BP Staff in Gulf Oil Spill Falls Flat, WALL
ST. J. (Feb. 28, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-bid-to-prosecute-bp-staff-in-gulf-oil-spill-fallsflat-1456532116 (describing the “ignominious end to the final case in the government’s effort to find
individuals criminally responsible for the blowout on the Deepwater Horizon,” in which a drill site
supervisor had difficulty describing what he did wrong to support his misdemeanor guilty plea).
87. Gilchrist, supra note 69, at 4.
88. See Haugh, supra note 3, at 153.
89. See id. at 155.
90. See id. at 155–56.
91. Gilchrist, supra note 69, at 4.
92. Id. at 45 (describing criticism of the DOJ for failure to bring more prosecutions and explaining
why many of these criticisms were, while understandable, probably misplaced).
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The problem, as Haugh makes clear, is that Serageldin was not a
senior Wall Street official, and aside from temporal overlap, his
criminal conduct had little to do with the financial crisis.93
This phenomenon of rarely prosecuting individuals, and when
doing so going after relatively low-level figures, is not isolated. A
recently published study of the issue found that, between 2001 and
2014, most corporate resolutions were not accompanied by an
individual prosecution, and the minority that were brought
prosecutions not against “high-up officers of the companies, but
rather middle managers of one kind or another.”94
The remainder of this Section explores the reasons for this
imbalance in criminal accountability. The DOJ’s emphasis on
individual accountability for corporate wrongdoing creates a real risk
of problematically selective accountability. This bias toward lowerlevel offenders is the result, first, of choice; second, of the process of
internal investigations; and third, of organizational structure and
decision-making. The conclusion one should draw from this is not
that individuals should never be prosecuted in the corporate context;
rather, the correct conclusion is that the effort to better police large
organizations through encouraging more individual prosecutions is
misguided, and potentially harmful.
1. Choice and the Problem of Non-Cooperation
Shortly after the Yates Memo appeared, one significant problem
was immediately identified.95 The new policies, though drafted with
strong language, actually offer corporations a choice. “To be eligible
for any cooperation credit, corporations must provide to the
Department all relevant facts about the individuals involved in
corporate misconduct.”96 Corporations can thus elect whether to

93. See Haugh, supra note 3, at 156–57.
94. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789, 1791
(2015).
95. See Joh & Joo, supra note 45, at 58.
96. Yates Memo, supra note 15, at 3 (emphasis in original).
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cooperate and seek credit or to forgo credit and cooperation.97 To be
sure, this choice is not new; corporations could always elect to not
cooperate with a criminal investigation.98 And the new policies
represent a shift toward coercing cooperation by rendering the
choice, at least in theory,99 all or nothing. Nonetheless, by permitting
the option of noncooperation, the policy suffers from the same
agency problems that render entity-level deterrence so weak.100
If the people running the investigation face criminal exposure
themselves, the decision to forgo any cooperation credit for the
corporation—credit that will take the form of monetary leniency
spread across all ownership—will be easy. Some corporations will
elect, through the decisions of self-interested agents, to forgo all
cooperation credit.101 Senior management exercises significant
influence over most internal investigations, and senior management
is subject to a conflict of interest on the question of self-reporting
where they face exposure. This possibility suggests that the pool of
self-reported problems will be generated with a systemic bias against
including cases of misconduct involving senior management.
Of course, senior management does not always exercise control
over internal investigations. Indeed, best practices dictate that when
an investigation reveals a conflict of interest for the legal department,
or whatever management role is leading the investigation,
responsibility for the investigation must shift to a non-conflicted
party, such as an audit committee.102 However, this shift happens
97. See Joh & Joo, supra note 45, at 58.
98. Indeed, it is possible the Yates Memo changed nothing and amounts to little more than political
talking points. See Joseph W. Yockey, Beyond Yates: From Engagement to Accountability in Corporate
Crime, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 409, 411 (2016).
99. See infra, Part II.A.2.
100. See Joh & Joo, supra note 45, at 58 (arguing that “[a]n offer of leniency toward the corporate
entity is unlikely to entice CEOs and other board members to incriminate themselves”).
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., JONES DAY, CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS: BEST PRACTICES, PITFALLS TO
AVOID
19–20
(2013),
http://www.jonesday.com/files/upload/CII%20Best%20Practices%20Pitfalls%20to%20Avoid2.pdf
(arguing that “where the corporation effectively is investigating its own management, the audit
committee or a special committee of the board of directors would likely be convened for the specific
purpose of supervising the internal investigation”).
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when someone in a management or board position requires it to
happen.103 Outside counsel can play an important role in effectively
shifting authority over the investigation,104 but in many, many cases,
management determines the scope and direction of the
investigation.105 Similarly, one might point out that law enforcement
is not solely reliant on internal investigations. Independent, external
investigations exist, as do whistleblowers.106 So, there will be
exceptions. However, given the significant role senior management
plays in a significant number of internal investigations, one would
expect a bias to manifest in disparate attention to corporate
malfeasance for which senior management is not responsible.
2. Information Asymmetry and the Problem of Selective
Cooperation
The problem of non-cooperation is compounded by information
asymmetry between law enforcement and those running the
investigation.107 Information in most corporate investigations runs
from those controlling the internal investigation to law
enforcement.108 This is not always the case, of course. Some
investigations involve whistleblowers who circumvent internal
control of the investigation.109 Others involve traditional, external
law enforcement tools, such as wiretaps and search
warrants.110Moreover, companies disclose information to the
103. Id. at 21.
104. Id. at 20.
105. See id.
106. See Bruce A. Green & Ellen S. Podgor, Unregulated Internal Investigations: Achieving Fairness
for Corporate Constituents, 54 B.C. L. REV. 73, 89 (2013).
107. Id. By law enforcement, the article refers broadly to the various persons and agencies responsible
for investigating and prosecuting corporate malfeasance, including investigative agencies such as the
FBI, as well as prosecuting attorneys such as those at United State Attorneys Offices, the DOJ, or state
Attorney General offices. See id.
108. See Garrett, supra note 94, at 1845.
109. See, e.g., Office of the Whistleblower, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2017) (soliciting reports of securities
violations and promoting significant financial rewards for whistleblowers).
110. These exceptions are functionally significant because the possibility of external detection of
internal problems critically influences the internal deliberations about whether to self-report. See Jason
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government. DOJ attorneys are perfectly capable of asking, and
routinely do ask, substantive and procedural follow-up questions:
who else saw this slide presentation; did you interview X; et
cetera.111 At the end of the day, however, the federal government
simply lacks the resources to police the vast majority of conduct
within corporations,112 and enforcement relies heavily on internal
investigations and self-reporting. In cases investigated internally,
those controlling the investigation exercise considerable control over
its course and extent.
This control introduces the possibility that corporations will, in
some cases, be able to withhold certain information about some
individuals while still receiving cooperation credit, because law
enforcement will be unable to discern the lack of candor.113 To the

Varnado & David Woodcock, To Self-Report or Not to Self-Report, TEX. LAW. (Dec. 1, 2016),
http://www.texaslawyer.com/id=1202772652517/To-SelfReport-or-Not-toSelfReport?slreturn=20161114144555 (identifying the possibility of independent investigation by law
enforcement and whistleblower reporting as two of the three primary reasons a company may elect to
self-report).
111. See Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Remarks at the 22nd Annual Ethics and Compliance Conference (Oct. 1, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-assistant-attorney-general-criminal-division-leslie-rcaldwell-22nd-annual-ethics (“Although the department welcomes and encourages corporate
cooperation, we do not rely upon it. We conduct our own robust investigations—often alongside that of
the company—to build our own criminal cases and to pressure-test corporate claims of cooperation.”).
112. See Darryl K. Brown, The Problematic and Faintly Promising Dynamics of Corporate Crime
Enforcement, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521, 529 (2004) (“The concern of government oppression is much
diminished in the corporate realm with respect to large firms. With large firms, the dynamic is reversed;
government may well lack the resources to effectively investigate and litigate against its private
opponent.”). Brown is mostly addressing the significant resources that large corporations must match to
beat traditional law enforcement. The challenge, however, extends well beyond this fact. The set of
“corporate conduct” is massive. It entails literally millions of decisions and actions every day, across the
globe. Millions may be too small by an order of magnitude. Consider that there are about 3,000
corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange. NYSE Companies, NASDAQ,
http://www.nasdaq.com/screening/companies-by-industry.aspx?exchange=NYSE (last visited Oct. 2,
2017). Most of these are large; some are giant. If each listed company engages in 1,000 transactions per
day (from entering a supply agreement with a foreign nation to purchasing new printers to hiring a news
sales representative), there would be three million individual transactions per day. That is only counting
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange. And 1,000 transactions per day is probably too few.
The point is, the scale of conduct that occurs within and on behalf of corporations is so vast that any
effort at external policing will, necessarily, only scratch the surface.
113. The Yates Memo itself acknowledges the opacity of internal corporate information. See Yates
Memo, supra note 15, at 2 (describing the difficulties of obtaining detailed information about corporate
conduct from an external perspective).
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extent those in charge of the investigation face possible personal
exposure, there is a strong incentive to limit the scope of the
investigation. While there are some checks against self-interest
corrupting the course of an internal investigation,114 they are not
strong.
It is therefore possible for organizations to selectively reveal
information to law enforcement while maintaining the posture of a
more complete disclosure. Internal investigations and self-reporting
are, in this way, little different than civil discovery; the responding
party is expected to make tactically beneficial decisions to the extent
doing so is defensible. These tactics can serve both the interests of
the organization and the interests of management.
In the case of a particular wrongdoing within and on behalf of a
corporation, the corporation possesses the most complete set of
knowledge about the misconduct. An internal investigation proceeds
with the primary goal of protecting the entity and the secondary goal
of gathering the relevant information.115 One might object that the
entity can only be protected once all the information is known. This
objection rests comfortably only in the realm of the ideal.
Investigations are messy.116 They involve information gathering, but
also, inevitably, the dissemination of information.117 Sometimes the
firm is legally barred from requiring confidentiality from its
employees.118 And in any event, employees can, and often do,

114. See Fallon, supra note 83, at 8.
115. See JONES DAY, supra note 102, at 45.
116. Jason M. Knott & Sara L.A. Lawson, The Yates Memo Calls for Greater Focus on Individual
Criminal Accountability for Corporate Crime: Who Wins and Who Loses?, A.B.A. LITIG. MATERIALS,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/2016_sac/written_mate
rials/4_knott%20_who_wins_and_who_loses.authcheckdam.pdf. To list but a few examples,
investigations can have a “negative impact on morale . . . [,] complicate the dynamic between outside
counsel hired to conduct the internal investigation and the high-level executives who may have played a
role in engaging this counsel,” and can cause “executives with even marginal exposure . . . to
resign.” Id.
117. Id.; Banner Estrella Med. Ctr., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 137, slip op. at 2–3 (2015).
118. See Banner Estrella Med. Ctr., 362 N.L.R.B No. 137, slip op. at 5 (ordering that company to
“[c]ease and desist from . . . [m]aintaining or enforcing a policy of requesting employees not to discuss
ongoing investigations of employee misconduct”).
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disregard confidentiality rules.119 As a result, one of the risks of
conducting an investigation is that the investigation itself will put the
entity in a worse position (for example, by increasing the risk of a
whistleblower on an issue the entity would not have elected to selfreport). Fundamentally, lawyers conducting internal investigations,
whether at the direction of senior management, a legal department, or
an audit committee, are acting to benefit the company.120 This
primary goal can be served in a variety of ways,121including more
fulsome, or less fulsome, information gathering and internal
remediation.
The difficulty of discerning the corporate interest is a constant;
however, the challenge is exacerbated where those being asked to
identify the corporate interest have a potential conflict. Independent
audit committees represent the most vigorous procedural check
against the risk of self-dealing in investigations. Delegating to an
audit committee the task of conducting an internal investigation,
including the role of selecting outside counsel, helps mitigate the risk
that the corporation’s best interest will be convoluted by the interests
of management.122 If nothing else, the Yates Memo is likely to cause
prosecutors to be less trusting of corporate investigations directed by
management than those directed by boards or audit committees.123
119. Merge Gupta-Sunderji, Three Reasons to Ignore your Company’s Policy Manual, THE GLOBE
MAIL
(Oct.
6,
2015,
5:00
PM),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-onbusiness/careers/leadership-lab/three-reasons-to-ignore-your-companys-policymanual/article26684784/.
120. See, e.g., Green & Podgor, supra note 106, at 74.
121. Id. at 91 (“The internal investigation industry basically operates with little oversight as the
investigations are unmonitored and unregulated.”).
122. SEC v. Worldcom, Inc., No. 02 CIV. 4963(JSR), 2003 WL 22004827, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26,
2003) (“[B]oards of directors, outside auditors and outside counsel are the gatekeepers of behavior
standards who are able to prevent damage before it occurs if they are alert, and above all if they are
willing to act when necessary.”).
123. Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Stanford, CA. Speech: A Few Things
Directors
Should
Know
About
the
SEC
(June
24,
2014),
https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542148863 (“Those of you who are directors
play a critically important role in overseeing what your company is doing, and by preventing, detecting,
and stopping violations of the federal securities laws at your companies, and responding to any problems
that do occur. In other words, you are the essential gatekeepers upon whom your investors and, frankly,
the SEC rely.”). This speech preceded the Yates Memo, but the view that enforcement will look to
directors as gatekeepers, coupled with the requirements of fulsome disclosure in the Yates Memo,
AND
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Yet, although delegating investigative authority to an audit
committee mitigates the risk of covertly limited investigations to
protect individuals, it does not eliminate the risk. The fact remains
that information flows upward in an organization, and throughout any
process, including an investigation, senior management can exercise
some influence on the process.
Sally Yates, when announcing the new policies now known as the
Yates Memo, said:
Effective immediately, we have revised our policy
guidance to require that if a company wants any credit for
cooperation, any credit at all, it must identify all individuals
involved in the wrongdoing, regardless of their position,
status or seniority in the company and provide all relevant
facts about their misconduct. It’s all or nothing. No more
picking and choosing what gets disclosed.124
Ultimately, this remains an aspirational demand, and the result is a
systemic bias in the investigative process that favors senior corporate
personnel whose interests will frequently align, or will be perceived
as aligning, with those of the people actually running the
investigation.
3. Organizational Hierarchy and the Distribution of Evidence
and Culpability
Lower-level personnel lack the institutional protections of their
senior colleagues, and they will also be disproportionately targeted
simply as a matter of evidence. This is an admittedly odd sentence,
and hopefully it gives the reader pause. “Simply as a matter of
evidence,” sounds like a tortured circumlocution to avoid saying that
suggest that the government sees the best compliance as board-driven compliance.
124. See, e.g., Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t. of Just., Remarks at New
York University School of Law Announcing New Policy on Individual Liability in Matters of Corporate
Wrongdoing (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-sallyquillian-yates-delivers-remarks-new-york-university-school.
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senior personnel did not commit any crimes. That criticism,
addressed below, is fair and, in many instances, accurate. To begin,
however, it is helpful to think about evidence.
In almost all cases where law enforcement identifies corporate
malfeasance, there exists at least one agent who caused the wrong.
Corporations act through, and only through, their agents.125 If a
corporation committed a crime, then, ipso facto, a person committed
a crime on behalf of the corporation.126 As then-Assistant Attorney
General Lanny Breuer put it: “Make no mistake: [w]hile the company
is guilty, individuals committed these crimes.”127 Indeed, given the
nature of most corporate malfeasance and organizational hierarchy,
there will often be many responsible agents.128 The corporate agents
who most directly committed the wrongdoing on behalf of the
organization tend to be lower-level personnel. Simply because of the
way organizational hierarchies distribute authority and
information,129 in any given instance those who act on behalf of the
organization tend not to be senior management. Crime often stems
from small decisions: the decision to retain a particular agent to assist
in bid procurement; the decision to accept a deposit without checking
every AML know-your-customer box; the decision to book sales in
violation of accepted accounting principles; et cetera. These
decisions are made by personnel further down the organizational

125. See, e.g., Green & Podgor, supra note 106, at 81–82.
126. One possible exception to this rule would be in jurisdictions allowing corporate mens rea to be
established through the collective knowledge doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of New Eng.,
821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987). In such cases, it is possible for a corporation to be guilty of a crime
even though no person exists who committed that crime, because the actions and mental states
comprising the crime are attributable to different corporate agents, none of whom would have held the
requisite mens rea, but who collectively can be used to hold the entity responsible. See id.
127. See Viswanatha, supra note 86.
128. See Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazábal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter, 2006 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 81, 86 (2006) (“[M]any corporations are large decentralized groups of individuals, often
with collectivized decision making structures and a multitude of actors participating in a single
corporate act.”).
129. See Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and
Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1197 (2003). In the corporate context, “the principal has delegated
a large amount of discretion to the agent—the principal hasn’t the time, expertise, or interest to make all
the decisions personally.” Id.
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hierarchy, and knowledge of these decisions is disproportionately
housed further down the organizational chart as well.
David Uhlmann describes the prosecutions following the BP
Deepwater Horizon disaster as “a classic example”130 of a case where
“the weight of criminal prosecution falls on individuals who, while
culpable, had no control over the corporate policies that led to
criminal activity.”131 Uhlmann notes “widespread agreement” that BP
maintained a corporate culture that promoted risk-taking over
environmental or workplace safety, and that this culture was the root
cause of the disaster.132 Yet the only people charged with crimes
following this preventable accident, which caused the death of eleven
men and untold environmental degradation, were rig supervisors who
“had no role in the development of BP’s policies or its corporate
culture.”133
The BP prosecutions were based on a key safety test that was not
conducted properly; accordingly, those who conducted or directly
supervised that test had the most exposure.134 On-site supervisors
were responsible for the test.135 The first results were unclear; a retest
led to similarly-unclear results.136 Subsequently, the supervisors
consulted and eventually authorized drilling to proceed.137 There
were 126 people aboard the vessel.138 Of these, only seven were BP
employees, whereas the rest worked for the rig-owner, Transocean,
or other subcontractors.139 Two BP employees, Robert Kaluza and
130. Uhlmann, supra note 27, at 1277.
131. Id.
132. See id. (citing NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE
DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING, 122–26
(2011), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf).
133. See id.
134. See Tom Fowler & Russell Gold, Engineers Deny Charges in BP Spill, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 18,
2012, 7:20 PM) http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323622904578127173280594296.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. See CHRISTINA INGERSOLL, RICHARD M. LOCKE & CATE REAVIS, MIT SLOAN MGMT., BP AND
DEEPWATER
HORIZON
DISASTER
OF
2010
1
(Apr.
3,
2012),
THE
https://mitsloan.mit.edu/LearningEdge/CaseDocs/10%20110%20BP%20Deepwater%20Horizon%20Lo
cke.Review.pdf.
139. See id.
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Donald Vidrine, were eventually charged (although not convicted)
with involuntary manslaughter, and committing a lawful act in an
unlawful manner, leading to the death of another.140 They were also
charged with negligence and inattention to duties while employed on
a vessel, leading to the death of another.141 The alleged “unlawful
manner” and negligence related exclusively to their failures in
responding to the uncertain safety test results, and the eventual
authorization to drill notwithstanding those results.142 Such failures
will tend to be isolated around the event itself, even if a deeper cause
of the failure is clearly identified in a problematic corporate
culture.143
Further from the event, evidence necessarily becomes more
attenuated. Perhaps the supervisor’s training was inadequate or even
misleading, but linking this failure to the eventual decision to drill
notwithstanding uncertain test results—a decision that may occur
many years and miles away from the training—is difficult. And the
poor training case seems simple from the prosecutorial perspective
when compared to the imagined prosecution of a senior executive for
having set a tone that contributed to a culture of risk-taking, which
undermined safety training and eventually led to a bad decision by
someone he never met on a rig he never visited. The public was quick
to scoff at senior DOJ officials who claimed that lack of evidence,
not lack of interest, led to the dearth of individual prosecutions in the
banking context following the financial crisis.144 But lack of
evidence, and the evidentiary complexity of these cases more
140. See Superseding Indictment for Involuntary Manslaughter, Seaman’s Manslaughter and Clean
Water Act at 9, United States v. Kaluza, No. 12-265, 2013 WL 6490341 (E.D. La. Nov. 14, 2012),
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/2520121115143638743323.pdf [hereinafter Superseding
Indictment, Kaluza].
141. See id. at 14.
142. See id. at 5–6.
143. In the BP case, these more serious charges were eventually abandoned by the prosecution or
dismissed by the court. See Viswanathan, supra note 86. Mr. Vidrine eventually pled guilty to a
misdemeanor offense, and Mr. Kaluza was acquitted at trial. See BP Engineer Is Not Guilty in Case
from
2010
Gulf
Oil
Spill,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Feb.
25,
2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/business/energy-environment/bp-engineer-is-not-guilty-in-casefrom-2010-gulf-oil-spill.html?_r=0.
144. Yockey, supra note 98, at 413.
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generally, is almost certainly the single most significant factor
limiting individual prosecutions.145
In the BP case, the real people charged, Kaluza and Vidrine, were
the senior employees on site.146 They reported to John Guide, who in
turn reported to David Sims, BP’s Manager of Drilling Operations
for the Gulf of Mexico.147 Multiple lines of report up the chain sat
Tony Hayward, who, in his three years as CEO, maintained an
“aggressive growth strategy” and “spoke publicly about his desire to
transform BP’s culture to one that was less risk averse.”148
Kaluza and Vidrine made the decision to drill notwithstanding the
inconclusive safety test results, and this formed the basis for their
indictment.149 But they would have made this decision knowing that
delay on an oil rig is incredibly costly.150 Indeed, subsequent
investigation revealed that this particular drilling operation, because
of weather and other delays, was already more than $20 million over
budget.151 And Kaluza functioned in a culture that openly favored
risk over safety.152 Kaluza and Vidrine likely assumed that their job
security and potential advancement would turn on their functioning
consistently with that culture. In the end, their decisions reflected
these facts.153
We may blame a culture of risk-taking, and disregard for safety
and environmental regulations, for a disaster like the one on the
145. Kathleen F. Brickey, Enron’s Legacy, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 221, 274–75 (2004). The lack of
complex corporate fraud cases stems not from “prosecutorial footdragging” but rather from the
complexity of the facts. Id. at 275.
146. Superseding Indictment, Kaluza, supra note 140, at 1.
147. See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, supra
note 132, at 97; see also David Hammer, BP Manager, Boss Both Ignored Warnings Before Deepwater
Horizon Blew, Panel Learns at Oil Spill Hearings, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Aug. 26, 2010, 5:45 PM),
http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/08/bp_manager_boss_both_ignored_w.html.
148. See INGERSOLL, LOCKE & REAVIS, supra note 138, at 3.
149. See Fowler & Gold, supra note 134.
150. See INGERSOLL, LOCKE & REAVIS, supra note 138, at 8 (“Transocean charged BP approximately
$500,000 per day to lease the rig, plus roughly the same amount in contractor fees.”).
151. See Hammer, supra note 147.
152. Id.
153. See INGERSOLL, LOCKE & REAVIS, supra note 138, at 19 (“[C]ourt testimony indicates that the
three key decisions [leading to the Deepwater Horizon disaster], and perhaps others as well, came down
on the side of cost-reduction and expediency, over caution.”).
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Deepwater Horizon. But when we look at culpable decisions made
with mens rea, evidence will aggregate on the rig and dissipate as we
move through the corporate structure to engineers onshore in Mexico
and eventually to corporate executives in Europe. The locus of
criminality rests, correctly, with those with “blatant culpability.”154
Simply put, the hierarchy and structure of corporations mean that
most corporate acts occur at levels many steps removed from central
management.155 Such acts might be pursuant to the directives,
policies, or tones set by central management, but lower-level
personnel perform most corporate acts.156 For example, central
management might set specific growth targets for the entity; product
divisions then establish their own goals to achieve the net target;
regional product divisions then set internal targets to contribute
toward the larger goal; and a particular salesperson decides whether
and how much puffery to engage in as he nears an unmet deadline. In
a fraud case, the clearest evidence will rest with the sales person who
made the untrue statements. It may be possible to craft a case against
managers who set goals, if it can be shown they knew their goals
could only be achieved through misrepresentations, but to describe
the case is to realize it is orders of magnitude more difficult than the
fraud case against the person who made the untrue statements.157
Even in the case where management did have the requisite mens rea,
finding evidence to support that fact is challenging.158 In many cases,
154. See Richman, supra note 1, at 270 (“The de facto requirement of blatant culpability—demanding
that a defendant be shown to have had a subjective awareness of real wrongdoing—is anchored in our
use of general jurisdiction prosecutors and judges and of lay jurors. It isn’t a bug in our system but a
feature.”).
155. Peter J. Henning, A New Crime for Corporate Misconduct?, 84 MISS. L.J. 43, 51 (2014) (“Many
corporate officials are far removed from the day-to-day company decisions that can turn out to be
fraudulent, so it is difficult to find evidence to establish their knowledge in the circumstantial
evidence.”).
156. Abril & Olazábal, supra note 128, at 122 (“[C]orporations themselves encourage illegality for
their own benefit, from sub rosa encouragement to fostering a culture of ‘making the numbers’ at all
costs, including illegality.”) (footnotes omitted).
157. See Coffee, supra note 30, at 229 (“[C]overt signals from senior corporate management can send
the implicit message throughout the organization that compliance with law is desirable, but increased
profitability is mandatory.”).
158. Peter Henning has described this evidentiary problem:
Unlike defendants who brandish weapons or traffic narcotics and stolen
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however, simply as a consequence of the nature of decision-making
and action within large organizations, senior management will, as a
matter of fact, lack the requisite mens rea.159
Some contend that the answer is to more effectively target highlevel personnel. One recent op-ed suggests increasing certainty of
punishment as a means of enhancing deterrence.160 The classic
formulation is to impose smaller penalties with greater frequency.161
In the corporate context, however, this represents a false alternative.
The failure to prosecute high-level corporate personnel does not stem
from a problem with, or concern about, large penalties. Nor does it
generally stem from a lack of enforcement resources. The failure,
such as it is, results from narrow substantive laws with appropriate
mens rea standards.162 Mere greed is not criminal.
One option prosecutors have when they lack evidence of the
substantive crime is to pursue the cover-up crimes. “[T]he reality is
that many white collar criminals have been prosecuted using crimes
that are ‘cover-up’ or ‘short-cut’ offenses, such as obstruction of
justice and making false statements.”163 While there is value in
prosecuting these sorts of offenses, the nature of corporate
governance suggests these prosecutions will also be aggregated
around particular personnel, and not necessarily the personnel most

property, whose denials of culpability are inherently suspect, a corporate
manager can plausibly claim to have been ignorant of the details of a
transaction, to not understand the full ramifications of what happened, or to
have believed that there was nothing improper about a decision because
other advisers—both inside and outside the company—never questioned its
propriety. Ignorance of the law may not be an excuse for a crime, but it can
be an effective defense when the violation requires proof of knowledge.
Henning, supra note 155, at 51.
159. Id.
160. See Robert H. Tillman & Henry N. Pontell, Corporate Fraud Demands Criminal Time, N.Y.
TIMES (June 29, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2989ZkN (suggesting “imposing relatively short prison sentences
on a much larger number of white-collar defendants”).
161. See Barry J. Pollack, ‘A Few Not So Good Men’: People Go to Prison, Nothing Changes, 14
ANDREWS SEC. LITIG. & REG. REP. 1, 2 (2009) (“Studies uniformly show that consistent application of
lesser penalties provides stronger deterrence than selective application of extreme penalties.”).
162. Henning, supra note 155, at 51.
163. See Ellen S. Podgor & Lucian E. Dervan, “White Collar Crime”: Still Hazy After All These
Years, 50 GA. L. REV. 709, 715 (2016) (footnotes omitted).
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responsible for the underlying wrongdoing.164 Compliance personnel
and attorneys face the greatest exposure for so-called cover-up
crimes, simply because reported malfeasance is generally directed
toward them and the failure to respond can generate exposure.165 As
with the systematic prosecution of actually-guilty-but-lower-level
offenders, the systematic prosecution of gatekeepers fails to address
the heart of the problem and risks devolving into something closer to
vengeance than justice.
Simply put, if prosecutors are pushed to bring individual cases
where evidence is lacking, they will be compelled to prosecute
lower-level offenders and more subsidiary crimes. To target the
misconduct that most frequently exists among corporate
management, the criminal law would need to address recklessness or
negligence. That would be a mistake.
B. The Normative Limits on Individual Corporate Prosecutions
Criminal law is inherently moral and expressive.166 In the
corporate context, criminal law is “our most powerful tool for
expressing what conduct is outside the bounds of acceptable
corporate behavior.”167 However, the expressive component of
criminal law is lost where the substantive law is unclear. Worse, post
hoc imposition of criminal liability for conduct not plainly forbidden
ex ante undermines the rule of law and generates a moral dissonance
that threatens the perceived legitimacy of the legal system. The
criminal law that applies in the corporate context is frequently

164. Henning, supra note 155, at 53.
165. Id.
166. See Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for Rehabilitation, 46 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1420 (2009) (“[D]esignating conduct as criminal is important apart from any
sanction imposed and that the application of the criminal law to an actor in society is a means to express
a moral judgment about that actor’s conduct.”); see also Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of
Punishment, 49 THE MONIST 397, 400 (1965) (distinguishing punishment by reference to the necessary
accompanying “expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval
and reprobation”).
167. Uhlmann, supra note 27, at 1263.

Published by Reading Room, 2018

33

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 2

368

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:2

lacking in clarity, and efforts to harness these vague criminal laws to
regulate corporate conduct more broadly are problematic.168
1. Overbroad and Unclear Criminal Laws
The substantive law sets forth a code, and violations of that code
are condemned. Some parts of the code are so fundamental as to be
entirely uncontroversial among sane adults who made it through
kindergarten: don’t murder;169 don’t hit;170 don’t take other people’s
stuff.171 Other parts are less evident: you may not sell a BB gun to a
minor in Massachusetts;172 you may not trade securities based on
material non-public information; 173and you may not try to secure a
business advantage by providing a thing of value to a foreign
government official.174 Absent a clear code to the contrary, these
latter offenses would be difficult to condemn.175

168. To be clear, criminal prosecutions can and should be brought against individual actors who
engage in forbidden conduct within a corporation. Nothing in this article should be understood as
arguing to limit the scope of criminal prosecutions where the prosecutor can produce evidence of guilt
sufficient to convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of a sufficiently-defined crime. Corporate
malfeasants can and should be punished. The current environment, however, sees a call for more
aggressive prosecutions and less burdensome substantive laws; this article challenges these systemic
efforts to enhance criminal prosecutions as a tool of corporate governance.
169. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.02 (West 2017) (“No person shall purposely cause the
death of another or the unlawful termination of another’s pregnancy.”).
170. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.13 (“No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause
physical harm to another or to another’s unborn.”).
171. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.02 (“No person, with purpose to deprive the owner of
property or services, shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either the property or services . . .
[w]ithout the consent of the owner . . . .”).
172. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, § 12A (2017) (“Whoever sells to a minor under the age of
eighteen or whoever, not being the parent, guardian or adult teacher or instructor, furnishes to a minor
under the age of eighteen an air rifle or so-called BB gun, shall be punished by a fine of not less than
fifty nor more than two hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than six months.”).
173. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(j), 78(t), 78(ff) (2012); 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.10b-5, 240.10b-5-2 (2017).
174. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 et seq. (2012).
175. One might object that all crimes require a clear code in order to condemn. This objection is
sound: ex ante clarity is a necessary component of condemnation. This difference between malum in se
crimes and malum prohibitum crimes is that the former enjoy a degree of clarity even without a legal
code, and this clarity is absent with the latter. In other words, the distinguishing characteristic of malum
in se crimes is the widely-shared normative clarity that requires no reference to substantive law
regarding these offenses.
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While it is true that this distinction between malum in se and
malum prohibitum crimes can be blurred, it remains useful at least to
identify poles on a spectrum.176 It is wise, however, not to vest too
much in the distinction, as it remains only as firm as the set of
common moral norms. Just twenty years ago, Robinson and Darley
wrote:
[C]urrent law has extended criminalization beyond even the
domain of traditional malum prohibitum offenses, to
criminalize conduct that is ‘harmful’ only in the sense that
it causes inconvenience for bureaucrats. Thus, most federal
regulations are now routinely converted to federal crimes to
give the regulators greater leverage in enforcement.177
Undoubtedly, many would still agree with this statement, but the
referent of the statement has probably shifted. Some number of
offenses that would have seemed plainly malum prohibitum two
decades ago now enjoy significant normative support, at least in
some communities. For example, although adding a criminal penalty
to a mine safety regulation178 at one point would have represented a
clear example of a tool for giving “regulators greater leverage in
enforcement,” the public interest in Massey CEO Don Blankenship’s
conviction for conspiracy to violate this rule suggests that the popular
norm surrounding mine safety has shifted.179
Still, closer examination of the mining regulations suggests the
alignment between public condemnation and legal violation is not so
precise. The public anger against Blankenship stems from the

176. It is precisely this failure of notice that helps bound legal culpability. Those who, by virtue of
youth or mental disability or defect, lack the capacity to understand the requirements of law are excused
from violations of the law.
177. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 479 (1997).
178. See 30 U.S.C. § 820(d) (2012).
179. See, e.g., Ken Ward, Jr., Ex-Massey CEO Blankenship now in California Federal Prison,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (May 12, 2016), http://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/20160512/exmassey-ceo-blankenship-now-in-california-federal-prison (detailing Massey reporting to serve his
prison sentence).
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perception that he disregarded the safety of his employees to
maximize profits;180 this anger erupted when twenty-nine miners lost
their lives in the Upper Big Mine Branch disaster.181 The indictment
taps into this particular and compelling source of blame in its first
paragraph, stating that Blankenship “fostered and participated in an
understanding that perpetuated [the] practice of routine safety
violations, in order to produce more coal, avoid the costs of
following safety laws, and make more money.”182 But the actual
regulation is, as would be expected, far more specific, revealing that
the systemic violations involved failures such as maintaining
insufficient pressure on water sprays meant to suppress dust and cool
equipment.183 The widely-shared norm condemns decision-making
that values profits over safety, at least where those decisions resulted
in the tragic death of twenty-nine men. And it may also condemn the
systematic and intentional disregard for specific regulations put in
place to prevent that type of disaster. However, it is far less likely
there is a widely-shared norm that would condemn reducing water
spray below a regulatory threshold. Even among those savvy enough
in mine safety to maintain a moral judgment about this relatively
esoteric practice, the judgment would probably be tied to a concept of
reasonableness for the particular operation, as opposed to the
arbitrary number set by federal regulation.

180. A highly critical Rolling Stone article gives a sense of the tenor of much of the public outcry. Jeff
Goodell, The Dark Lord of Coal Country, ROLLING STONE (Nov. 29, 2010),
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-dark-lord-of-coal-country-20101129 (describing how
Blankenship “transformed himself into the embodiment of everything that’s wrong with the business
and politics of energy in America today—a man who pursues naked self-interest and calls it patriotism,
who buys judges like cheap hookers, treats workers like dogs, blasts mountains to get at a few inches of
coal and uses his money and influence to ensure that America remains enslaved to the 19th-century idea
that burning coal equals progress. And for this, he earns $18 million a year—making him the highestpaid CEO in the coal industry—and flies off to vacations on the French Riviera.”).
181. Id. (citing the “fact that 29 men died violent deaths in large part because Don Blankenship ran
what amounted to an outlaw coal mine, racking up more than 500 safety violations and nearly $1 million
in fines last year alone”).
182. Indictment at 1, United States v. Blankenship, No. 5:14-cr-00244, 2014 WL 6386743 (S.D.W.
Va. Nov. 13, 2014).
183. Id. at 8.
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The criminal law has drifted, and continues to drift, beyond the
limited field of obviously immoral conduct into risk regulation.184
Bernard Harcourt argued years ago that the harm principle, originally
a necessary-but-insufficient condition for criminalization, had
become toothless because harm is ubiquitous.185 He concluded that
“harm is no longer in fact a necessary condition because non-trivial
harm arguments are being made about practically every moral
offense.”186 And, as both Harcourt and Joel Feinberg concede, the
harm principle gives little or no guidance for comparing or weighing
harms.187 If morality is no longer a necessary condition for
criminalization, and the harm principle has metastasized into almost
all human activity, then the answer to Feinberg’s original question—
“what sorts of conduct may the state rightly make criminal?”188—
may consist of little more than procedural requirements, such as
representation, deliberation, and notice.189
The emphasis on risk over morality in criminal law is particularly
strong in the corporate context. Where substantive factors no longer
bound criminalization, the procedural factors gain significance. As
the law seeks to condemn conduct about which there is less shared
and less obvious moral ground, it is increasingly reliant on
establishing its own clarity. The law must plainly state that which is

184. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 98 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[A]ll sorts of
perfectly harmless activity by millions of perfectly innocent people can be forbidden—riding a
motorcycle without a safety helmet, for example, starting a campfire in a national forest, or selling a safe
and effective drug not yet approved by the Food and Drug Administration. All of these acts are entirely
innocent and harmless in themselves, but because of the risk of harm that they entail, the freedom to
engage in them has been abridged.”).
185. See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
109, 114 (1999).
186. Id.
187. Id. Feinberg concedes that, ultimately, the harm principle is “largely an empty formula”;
however, he also introduces a catalogue of comparative principles “meant to help the hypothetical
legislator by providing his nearly vacuous guiding principle with a little more content, a little clearer
direction.” JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 188, 203
(1984).
188. Feinberg, supra note 187, at 3.
189. Indeed, this seems to be the view expressed by Justice Scalia in Morales. See Morales, 527 U.S.
at 73–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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forbidden and punish only that which is forbidden.190 Failure to do so
leaves people subject to condemning punishment191 for behavior not
subject to any widely-shared norm, unlimited by any cogent harm
principle, and without notice. In such instances, the condemnation
inherent in punishment falters and we are left with something more
like a tantrum than a principled punishment. If we are to punish
without moral grounding, then clarity of notice becomes critical.
Unfortunately, the criminal law that is generally applied in the
corporate context is not at all clear. Substantive corporate law—that
is, the set of rules governing conduct in the corporate setting—is
broad and in a near-constant state of flux. Questions about the scope
of prohibited conduct under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act are seemingly limitless.192 Early efforts to govern
corporate conduct—through administrative civil actions—involved
enforcement decisions with retroactive definitional impact.193 In the
administrative context, what appeared to be overbroad substantive
laws were upheld as lawful delegations of authority.194 These early
efforts to govern corporations may be the foundation for the vague
standards and imprecise language that characterize much of the
substantive corporate criminal law today.195 The result is plain: the

190. See Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 48 (1997) (“The moral nature of the criminal law should not be undercut by
permitting the criminal punishment of those who cannot fairly be blamed for their actions.”).
191. To punish is to blame. See JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF
RESPONSIBILITY 98 (1970) (identifying the “symbolic significance” and the “expression of attitudes of
resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation” as distinctive aspects of
punishment).
192. See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 472 (1996).
193. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
194. Id. at 197. The controlling statute in Chenery was the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935, which empowered the SEC to limit the issuance or sale of securities.
195. Id. at 208. The connection between the legal underpinnings of the expanding administrative state
and expansive criminal laws is limited. Indeed, a fundamental tenet of Chenery, and subsequent
decisions grounding the administrative state, is the subject matter policy expertise of designative
executive agencies. The DOJ and U.S. Attorneys—the executive actors most responsible for
interpretation and enforcement of criminal laws—have admirable expertise, ability, and independence;
but, with the exception of a few anomalous divisions within DOJ, few would claim these executive
actors exercise strong subject matter expertise over the matters governed by corporate criminal law.
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scope of potentially-forbidden conduct in the corporate context is
broad and poorly defined.196
Insider trading is replete with uncertainty. Scholars have mounted
a sustained attack on the lack of clarity in insider trading law.197
Honest services fraud has been subject to continued attack as
impermissibly vague.198 Corruption law is little better.199
The breadth and lack of clarity in corporate criminal law are not
new. Ellen Podgor wrote in 1994 that “white collar crime is changing
so rapidly that it is difficult to provide a firm or constant setting for
its understanding.”200 Nearly a decade and a half earlier, Jed Rakoff
wrote of the possibility that “the scope of the mail fraud statute is too
great, either in requiring only a very minimal amount of
reprehensible conduct to trigger its application or in extending its
application to an immensely broad and as-yet ill-defined spectrum of
intentions and activities . . . .”201 Many of the criminal laws that
196. This point is related to, but distinct from, complaints about overcriminalization.
Overcriminalization refers to the state of criminalizing far more conduct than should or could be
enforced. See Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags
to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 748 (2005). There are many serious problems stemming
from overcriminalization, including the possibility of over-incarceration. But see Peter J. Henning,
Making Sure “The Buck Stops Here”: Barring Executives for Corporate Violations, 2012 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 91, 107–08 (“The critique that there is overcriminalization appears to be used more as a
placeholder to describe how the criminal law has expanded so that there are too many defendants being
prosecuted and incarcerated, sometimes for significant periods of time.”). One problem of criminalizing
too much conduct is that it “give[s] enforcement authorities far too much unchecked discretion to select
those few cases that will actually be prosecuted.” Beale, supra, at 766. The breadth and poor definition
of laws applied to corporate conduct trigger this concern in particular.
197. See, e.g., John P. Anderson, Solving the Paradox of Insider Trading Compliance, 88 TEMP. L.
REV. 273, 274 (2016); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Just Do It! Specific Rulemaking on Materiality
Guidance in Insider Trading, 72 LA. L. REV. 999, 1000–01 (2012); Joan MacLeod Heminway,
Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider Trading: A Call for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131,
1133–34 (2003); Donald C. Langevoort, Informational Cronyism, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE (Oct.
2016), https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/informational-cronyism/ (describing the massive
uncertainty inherent in the line between civil and criminal enforcement being defined by the
“inexcusably elusive” standard of “willfulness”).
198. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 408–09 (2010) (limiting honest services fraud under
18 U.S.C. § 1346 to bribe and kickback schemes).
199. The Supreme Court recently brought needed, if still too little, clarity to corruption law. See
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2367–68 (2016) (limiting the meaning of “official act”
under 18 U.S.C. § 201).
200. See Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate and White Collar Crime: Simplifying the Ambiguous, 31 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 391, 391 (1994).
201. See Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 821 (1980)
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apply to corporate actors are expansive and poorly drafted, and they
fail to give notice as to what conduct is forbidden. Some uncertainty
is unavoidable, if only as the consequence of our reliance on a
language that is organic and less-than-mathematically precise.202
Much of the criminal law in the corporate context, however, remains
problematically uncertain.
2. One Rule of Law Problem: Unbound Discretion
The rule of law is very near to a first principle in legal theory, and
yet, or perhaps because of that, it suffers from a lack of analytic
precision.203 This is probably more of an academic problem than a
practical one. Practicing attorneys and judges refer to the rule of law
with considerably less skepticism and confusion than scholars.204
Putting aside the fundamental definitional challenges, a basic and
relatively uncontroversial aspect of the rule of law is a limit on the
power to deprive others of life, liberty, or property, except where
there exists a predetermined set of conditions that permit that
deprivation.205 The problem with this description, however, is that by
failing to define the condition pursuant to which one may be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, it is rendered empty. For example, were it
established that one may be deprived of life, liberty, or property if
(advocating a jurisdictional approach to the use of mails element, while recognizing the possibility that
this would cause the mail fraud statute to become unmanageably broad).
202. See Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. PA. L.
REV. 335, 357 (2005) (“However, there is no requirement that a criminal statute include only words that
are subject to ‘mathematical certainty.’”).
203. See Fallon, supra note 83, at 41 (“Viewed through skeptical lenses, the Rule of Law might
appear, at best, to be no more than an honorific title for an amalgam of the values, and the preferred
means for promoting those values.”). Fallon rejects the skeptical lenses, but the uncertainty surrounding
this widely-used concern is undeniable.
204. See, e.g., Savransky, supra note 16. In response to now-former-Acting Attorney General Sally
Yates’s refusal to enforce President Trump’s executive order barring entry for people from seven
predominantly Muslim nations, the former-Attorney General Loretta Lynch stated, “With her decision
not to defend the executive order regarding immigration, Sally Yates displayed the fierce intellect,
unshakeable integrity, and deep commitment to the rule of law that have characterized her 27 years of
distinguished service to the DOJ under both Democratic and Republican administrations.” Id. (emphasis
added).
205. See Paul F. Kirgis, Judicial Review and the Limits of Arbitral Authority: Lessons from the Law of
Contract, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 99, 105 (2007).
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and only if the king deemed it appropriate, that would establish a
limiting principle, but it does not describe what people refer to when
they speak of the rule of law.
Jennifer Arlen proposes a normative hook via an instrumental
conception of the rule of law captured as a series of limits on the
authority of various governmental actors to exercise discretion.206
She posits that the primary mechanism for limiting discretion and
promoting the rule of law entails maintaining a separation between
“three separate exercises of authority: authority to create duties,
authority to interpret existing duties, and authority to enforce duties
and sanction their violation.”207 By ensuring that “no individual actor
or office enjoys all three forms of authority,” legal systems limit
discretion and promote the rule of law.208 Lawyers and civics
students alike can easily recognize this pattern. Separation of powers:
the legislature makes the laws, the judiciary interprets the laws, and
the executive enforces the laws.209
Law enforcement in the corporate context has deviated too far
from this model. True, the legislature makes the laws. But by
enacting laws that are expansive in scope and imprecise in limit, the
legislature puts too small a limit on the scope of enforcement
discretion. Indeed, there may be no better example than securities
fraud by which to undermine the oft-repeated claim210 that federal
criminal law is statutory.211 Much substantive criminal law has been
written by courts.212
206. Jennifer Arlen, Prosecuting Beyond the Rule of Law: Corporate Mandates Imposed Through
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 191, 191 (2016).
207. Id. at 193.
208. Id.
209. The link between the rule of law and separation of powers is not new. See GORDON S. WOOD,
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, 150–61 (1992). Wood contends that “[w]hen
Americans in 1776 spoke of keeping the several parts of the government separate and distinct, they were
primarily thinking of insulating the judiciary and particularly the legislature from executive
manipulation.” Id. at 157. This point is particularly interesting in the context of white collar
prosecutions, and arguably all prosecutions, where the executive has continued to expand its authority
over almost all aspects of the criminal process.
210. See Kahan, supra note 192, at 471 (“[T]he proposition that federal crimes are ‘solely creatures of
statute’ is a truth so partial that it is nearly a lie.”) (footnote omitted).
211. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider
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This is not to suggest enforcement discretion is unbounded; it is
not. As Russell Covey points out, “true unguided discretion is
extremely rare, if not altogether absent, in law.”213 Indeed, one might
respond that this is necessarily true, as “true unguided discretion”
represents the absence of law.214 This, however, misses Covey’s
point. Covey is not making a claim about the nature of law; he is
describing the situation that in modern, functioning legal systems—
even those that might deviate from the rule of law in certain ways—
actual unbounded discretion rarely occurs.215 This is almost certainly
true of the legal system in the United States.
For example, prosecutorial discretion is often referenced as one of
the least restricted forms of discretion in the criminal justice system,
and for good reason. Courts have consistently refused to exercise
meaningful review over the prosecutor’s discretionary decisions.216
But prosecutorial discretion is not unbound. A prosecutor’s decision
about whether to charge remains limited by a host of factors,
including the evidence available to present to a grand jury, the
potential ire of the judge in front of whom she must repeatedly
appear, the supervision of her superiors, and her officer’s answer to
the political process. Complaints about prosecutorial discretion tend
not to be that the discretion is unlimited, but rather that the limits are
insufficient.217
Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1201 (1995) (“The federal insider trading
prohibition thus is best classified within the genus of federal common law.”); Samuel W. Buell, What Is
Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 545 (2011) (“The law of securities fraud is one of the most
heavily judicially created bodies of federal law.”).
212. Daniel Richman, Overcriminalization for Lack of Better Options, in THE POLITICAL HEART OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON THEMES OF WILLIAM J. STUNTZ 64, 68 (Michael Klarman, David
Skeel & Carol Steiker eds., 2012).
213. See Russell D. Covey, Rules, Standards, Sentencing, and the Nature of Law, 104 CAL. L. REV.
449, 450 n.13 (2016).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996).
217. See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutorial Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581,
581–82 (2009) (describing the failure of the political process as a meaningful limit); David Keenan,
Deborah Jane Cooper, David Lebowitz & Tamar Lerer, The Myth of Prosecutorial Accountability After
Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against
Prosecutorial Misconduct, YALE L.J. ONLINE 203, 210 (2011) (describing the failure of codes of
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Poorly-drafted, uncertain, and potentially-overbroad laws represent
the legislature’s failure to limit the discretion of the executive
enforcement function. The claim in the corporate criminal context is
not about absolute discretion; it is about excessive discretion. Given
the poor state of substantive laws, the legislative limit on the
executive falters. Arlen’s instrumental theory of the rule of law
points to one solution: review and interpretation by courts.218 Some
laws do too little to define the forbidden and thus do little to limit
discretion, and in those cases courts will strike the law as void for
vagueness.219 The complaint against most corporate criminal laws is
not that they set no standard at all, but rather that they require “a
person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible
normative standard.”220 Courts can and do mitigate this type of
imprecision through their interpretive function.221
3. Another Rule of Law Problem: Notice
Punishment absent notice is not law; it is the mere exercise of
power.222 Fundamental to the rule of law is the principle that those
subject to the command of law must be given notice as to both the
forbidden or required conduct and the penalty for non-compliance.223
In practice, this principle is as obvious as it is difficult to manage.
The rule of lenity offers respite against failures of notice, which
are frequent in the white-collar context.224 In practice, however, the
rule of lenity has not served this function, because courts too
conduct as a meaningful limit).
218. See generally Arlen, supra note 206.
219. See, e.g., Morales, 527 U.S. at 60 (“This ordinance is therefore vague ‘not in the sense that it
requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but
rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.’”) (quoting Coates v. City of
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)).
220. Coates, 402 U.S. at 614.
221. Id.
222. See Robinson, supra note 202, at 336 (“In its original Latin dress, the legality principle was
expressed as ‘nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege,’ meaning roughly ‘no crime without law,
nor punishment without law.’”).
223. Id. (“[C]riminal liability and punishment can be based only upon a prior legislative enactment of
a prohibition that is expressed with adequate precision and clarity.”).
224. Id. at 346–47.
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frequently decline to apply the rule.225 Perhaps judicial disfavor
develops because the rule would accomplish too much. Justice
Breyer, after identifying cases invoking the rule of lenity, noted that
“[t]he problem of statutory interpretation in these cases is indeed no
different from that in many of the criminal cases that confront us.”226
Perhaps the lack of clarity in criminal laws is the norm, not the
exception. And if that’s the case, a vibrant rule of lenity may well
devolve into a simplistic and unworkable mechanism that
“automatically permits a defendant to win.”227
In the corporate context, lack of clarity is the norm, and common
law refinement fails to address the notice problem. To satisfy due
process, “a penal statute [must] define the criminal offense (1) with
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited and (2) in a manner that does not encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”228 The judicial process is
an imperfect fix in an imperfect world; courts introduce clarity to
vague statutes over time, but the cost is significant where people are
punished for conduct that was not plainly forbidden.
4. The Common Law “Solution”
The solution to overbroad and unclear criminal laws, such as it is,
has been for courts to offer clarity incrementally. Common law
crimes are generally considered anathema to basic principles of
legality.229 However, as Dan Kahan describes, a “system of federal
common law crimes” not only exists; it does so “(in part) because it
works so much better than the imaginary regime of legislative crimes
ever would.”230 As described above, federal criminal laws are more
225. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998) (describing a rule of lenity of
extremely limited scope, applying only in the rare case where the statute is so unclear as to leave the
courts with “no more than a guess as to what Congress intended”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
226. See id. at 139.
227. Id.
228. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402–03 (2010) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461
U.S. 352, 357 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
229. See Kahan, supra note 192, at 469.
230. Id. at 470.
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often than not open-ended, vague, and unclear. This is particularly
true in the corporate context. Often, this is true by design.231 This is a
problem, and courts are a solution.
Or rather, a partial solution. The incremental refinements imparted
by judicial review of real cases and controversies capture the nuances
of life as no cloistered code ever could.232 As a mechanism for
developing good rules, it is difficult to imagine a better approach.
However, Kahan’s pragmatism about definitional capacity offers
little comfort to those “languishing in prison [where no] lawmaker
has clearly said they should.”233 Criminal law remains our best tool
for designating certain conduct beyond the pale in terms of
acceptable corporate behavior.234 But much of the conduct designated
as criminal is by no means beyond the pale—this conduct is too
broad, too ill-defined, and too widely-practiced.235 Post hoc decisions
designating the behavior criminal do nothing to address this problem.
A common law approach to criminal law overcomes limited
legislative imagination, but it falters on the notice problem.
5. The Cost of Imposing Criminal Liability Without Notice
The imposition of criminal punishment ought to be different in
kind than the imposition of civil liability. Even assuming identical
penalties—e.g., deprivation of property—there remains a difference
between conviction of a crime and a finding of liability. Criminal law
condemns,236 and the condemnation rings hollow where it is based on
231. Sam Buell tackles this problem head-on regarding fraud, writing that “[f]raud is somewhat like
negligence in that it is designed to be an all-encompassing concept of wrong that a common-law system
of adjudication can deploy as needed and define as it goes along, addressing cases ex post.” Buell, supra
note 211, at 520–21.
232. John Hasnas, Reflections on Prince, Public Welfare Offenses, American Cynanamid, and the
Wisdom of the Common Law, J. CRIM. LAW AND PHIL. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 2) (on file
with Georgia State University Law Review).
233. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted).
234. See Uhlmann, supra note 27, at 1263.
235. For more on the challenging relationship between criminal law, regulation, and institutional
politics, see Richman, supra note 1, at 265 and Richman, supra note 212, at 65.
236. See FEINBERG, supra note 191, at 92, 98 (1970) (identifying the “symbolic significance” and the
“expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and
reprobation” as distinctive aspects of punishment); see also Hart, supra note 29, at 404 (“What
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a post hoc definition of a rule grounded only in positive law. The
laws are broad; they are unclear; and sometimes they are actually
indeterminate before the fact. Imposing criminal liability under these
conditions threatens to dilute—if not eliminate—the sole distinctive
component of the criminal law, moral condemnation, because we
cannot sensibly blame people for behaving in a manner that is neither
morally problematic on its own terms nor plainly forbidden by
law.237
When those who could not have known they were violating the
law are punished, it is sometimes rationalized by reference to
assumption of risk. As a British Lord famously put it: “Those who
skate on thin ice can hardly expect to find a sign which will denote
the precise spot they fall in.”238 But, as this colorful quote illustrates,
assumption of risk fails to capture the expressive component of
criminal punishment; perhaps the person who skated too close to thin
ice cannot complain about getting wet, but we might not condemn
him. This is particularly true in the corporate setting, where entire
industries exist to help people and corporations profitably operate
near poorly-defined legal limits.239 Forget the lone daredevil;
consider instead a cautious village that thrives when it sends
fishermen near the edge of the ice.
III. A Better Approach: Civil Accountability
Redoubling efforts to prosecute individuals in the corporate
context will fail. The accountability gap will persist, and the result
will be something more like show trials against mostly lower-level
distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all that distinguishes it, it is ventured, is the judgment
of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition.”).
237. See Lynch, supra note 190, at 47 (“Both in justice to those so labeled, and to preserve the
always-threatened moral capital of the criminal law from dilution, conviction of crime must ordinarily
be reserved for those who violate deeply held and broadly agreed social norms.”).
238. See Knuller Ltd. v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecution (1972) 56 Cr. App. R. 633 (HL) 652 (appeal taken
from UK); see also Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952) (“[I]t is not unfair to
require that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the
risk that he may cross the line.”).
239. See Lynch, supra note 190, at 45.
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employees who are present at the locus of the problematic decisions.
Complaints about the state of corporate law enforcement do not stem
from a failure to prosecute engineers, sales reps, or middle managers.
Yet these are the prosecutions we should expect law enforcement to
generate by redoubling our law enforcement efforts to charge
individuals; strong cases with good evidence cluster further down the
corporate hierarchy.240
The problem with corporate law enforcement, writ large, is one of
accountability. Corporations exert influence throughout our
economy, our environment, and our society. The specific decisions
that have positive and negative effects are often made well down the
organizational chart, simply because that is the nature of decisionmaking in large organizations.241 But those decisions are not made in
a vacuum. They are made in the context of an organizational culture
that pushes behavior in a particular direction. Culture is complex,
both as a matter of composition and effect.242 Exactly what creates
the culture is not susceptible to careful analysis, and there is little
precision to inquiries about how culture influenced a particular
decision. It is now uncontroversial to maintain that BP, prior to the
Deepwater Horizon disaster, maintained a culture that favored risk
over safety.243 But this observation leaves two questions: who is
responsible for that culture, and how did that culture influence the
decisions on and around the rig in the hours and days leading to the
disaster? Neither question is well-suited for the blunt machinery of
criminal justice, which favors the binary choice between guilt and
innocence.
Outside the sphere of criminal law, however, the questions are
easier. Senior executives and directors establish, maintain, and
promote an organizational culture.244 Perhaps no single speech will
240. See Henning, supra note 155, at 53.
241. Id.
242. See Bucy, supra note 23, at 1123–27 (summarizing the literature examining distinctions in
corporate cultures).
243. See Uhlmann, supra note 27, at 1277 (citing NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON
OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, supra note 132, at 122–26).
244. See Miriam Hechler Baer, Corporate Policing and Corporate Governance: What Can We Learn
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capture the culture, but culture flows inevitably from the behavior,
decisions, and incentives established by leadership. The 2016 scandal
at Wells Fargo stands as a stark reminder of how a corporate culture
can be influenced by overly aggressive sales quotas and incentives,
and how such a culture can manifest in illegal conduct by lower-level
employees.245 Yet many corporate cultures are more nuanced. They
are built on years of behavior by key corporate actors, including
promotion decisions and other incentives, as well as more direct
messages about the values of the corporation.246 Understood this
way, culture is both simple and imprecise.
People understand organizational culture, and we understand it
influences behavior, but with any particular question of
accountability the inquiry tends to falter. When GM failed over the
course of a decade to recall cars with faulty ignition switches,247 we
now know this failure had to do with GM’s culture, but not in a way
that fits with the evidentiary standard necessary to impose criminal
liability.
This creates the accountability gap. The public blames senior
management for corporate wrongdoing.248 The blame is not irrational
anger. It is grounded in the recognition that the most directly culpable
and lower-level employees did not get lax about controls or violate
the law in a vacuum; they did so in an environment that encouraged
them to take these risks. But this imprecise blame does not comport
with basic principles of legality for imposing criminal liability. We
are left, accordingly, with criminal liability for the entity and

from Hewlett-Packard’s Pretexting Scandal?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 523, 542 (2008). While “tone at the
top” is the core of organizational culture, as Baer notes, all organizational actors play a role in defining
that culture. Id. (“The creation of the organization’s ethical culture is generated both by the company’s
directors and officers—who set the ‘tone at the top’—by its lawyers and accountants, and by the
multitude of mid-level managers who interact with rank-and-file employees.”) (footnotes omitted).
245. Emily Glazer, How Wells Fargo’s High-Pressure Sales Culture Spiraled out of Control, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2016, 3:10 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-wells-fargos-high-pressure-salesculture-spiraled-out-of-control-1474053044.
246. See Baer, supra note 244, at 541.
247. David M. Uhlmann, Justice Falls Short in G.M. Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/20/opinion/sunday/justice-falls-short-in-gm-case.html?mcubz=0.
248. See Uhlmann, supra note 27, at 1265.
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sometimes for some low-level employees, and little or no
accountability among senior management who contributed to and
profited from the culture that bred the misconduct.
A. The Blame Being Assigned Is for Recklessness
Peter Henning explored the accountability gap, and in doing so, he
isolated heightened mens rea requirements as the most significant
reason so few senior executives are prosecuted in these cases.249
“[O]ne potential response . . . may be to reduce the requisite intent
element, so that it is easier to pursue a case and establish a violation
when there are substantial losses from corporate decisions.”250 To be
clear, Henning is not advocating a recklessness standard; he is
exploring the costs and benefits of such a standard, simply because it
is the simplest fix if we conclude that the failure to prosecute senior
management for corporate misconduct requires remedying.251
The call for a recklessness standard is important because it
perfectly captures the source of public condemnation. As described
above, the public blames those whose recklessness causes harm; but,
it is worth recognizing that the public also likely celebrates those
whose recklessness generates profits or success.252 The problem in
the corporate context is that management must make decisions about
fantastically complex markets with radically imperfect
information.253 Gauging the correct risk threshold in these
circumstances is impossible.254 Indeed, this is precisely the reason we
allow discretion when setting appropriate risk tolerances for business
249. Henning, supra note 155, at 46. Most criminal laws applicable to corporate misconduct require
“specific intent to commit the crime, a seemingly insurmountable standard of proof for cases related to
the financial crisis.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
250. Id. at 47.
251. Id. at 88–89.
252. See Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard:
Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in Germany and the United States, 40 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1433, 1440 (2010).
253. Id. at 1440–41.
254. Id. at 1438 (“[T]he concepts of ‘market failure’ and ‘excessive risk’ are both controversial.
Whether markets fail and why they fail is one issue, and whether there is any such thing as excessive
risk, and if so, how excessive risk is to be defined, is another issue.”).
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decisions by applying the highly protective business judgment rule to
post hoc criticism of management.255
Imposing criminal liability for recklessness would undoubtedly
change the calculus to favor loss avoidance over risk, but this is not
necessarily a good thing. As Henning concluded:
[L]oss avoidance runs counter to the usual approach to
corporate decision-making; a certain measure of risk must
be undertaken to develop a business and generate
reasonable returns. The only approach virtually guaranteed
to involve no appreciable risk of loss is doing nothing, but
that also means there will be little if any return on
investment.256
We blame excessive risk-taking where it fails. But this is a
different kind of blame than that reserved for knowing or intentional
wrongdoing. In these cases, the perpetrator was, almost invariably,
trying to function within the law. She was hoping to manage the
business in such a way as to maximize the return on investment, and
risks necessarily accompany this effort. Recklessness requires both
the “subjective element involving the defendant’s awareness of the
risk stemming from a particular decision, and the objective
requirement that the conduct be ‘far below’ what a reasonable person
in a similar position would have done.”257 In many business
255. See Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 839 (1981) (“The [business judgment] rule operates to
bar courts from providing additional, and unnecessary, constraints on management discretion through
judicial review of operating decisions.”).
256. Henning, supra note 155, at 63.
257. Id. at 78–79. Here, Henning is describing the recklessness standard established by the British
Banking Reform Act, which criminalizes recklessness in managing a financial institution. See Banking
Reform Act (2013) §§ 36(1)(b)–(d) (U.K.). But the standard is familiar as it mirrors the ALI Model
Penal Code:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense
when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the
actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves
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decisions, those making the decision are often aware of the risks; the
subjective element is plainly met. So, the only point of inquiry would
be whether the risks were unjustifiable; that is, whether the risk was
of “such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose
of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that
a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.”258 Too
often, assessed in the pallid gloom of failure, risks will be difficult to
justify and easy to condemn.
None of this suggests we cannot blame the reckless who fail, but
perhaps we do not condemn them. Condemnation, after all, has long
been the distinctive function of criminal law.259 In free markets, post
hoc assessments and bad luck separate those who thrive and profit
from those who fail.260 Criminalizing reckless or negligent
management threatens to allow these same factors to distinguish
those who thrive and profit from those who are imprisoned and
condemned. Too often the conduct will be the same, and only
circumstantial consequences will differ. That should not be the
distinction between success and criminality.
B. Corporate Recklessness Is Better Addressed Through Civil
Liability
Aside from the mens rea challenge, too many wrongs in the
corporate context are poorly defined ex ante. This definitional
challenge results not only from poor legislating, but also from the
complexity of the economy and the multitude of ways clever actors
seek an edge.261 As a means of identifying the scope of forbidden
a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person
would observe in the actor’s situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(c).
258. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(c).
259. See Hart, supra note 29, at 405.
260. Henning, supra note 155, at 63.
261. Buell, supra note 211, at 520 (“This need for flexibility in the definition of fraud arises because
fraud involves a category of human wrongdoing that is characterized by inventiveness and that is often
situated within realms of economics, technology, and industry that are sites of rapid social and economic
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conduct, the common law is plainly superior to legislation. John
Hasnas captured this when he wrote, “[W]hen I step back from my
role as advocate and engage in detached philosophical reflection, I
am impressed by the subtle sophistication of the common law
process . . . and find it conceptually superior to the output of the last
century of criminal legislation.”262 The superiority of common law as
a mechanism for delineating between legal and illegal conduct is
plain: it is easier to assess conduct in a particular case than to define
the forbidden without context. Life is always more complicated and
nuanced than imagined on the floor of the legislature, and courts
engage directly with these complexities and nuances when reviewing
particular cases and controversies.263
The shortcoming of common law remains that it is inconsistent
with the legality principle. Criminal law is different: it imposes moral
condemnation and punishment on plainly forbidden conduct; rules of
utility and regulation are, or should be, civil.264 To recognize that
there is a set of problematic conduct that cannot be defined ex ante,
but must be punished ex post, does not end the inquiry. Our legal
system has multiple means of imposing punishment, and criminal
liability is not only the most severe, it is also the type of law subject
to the legality principle that is, at very least, in tension with what has
effectively become common law crime.
Civil liability does not face the same challenges. Prosecutors ought
to look to civil law in seeking to hold senior personnel
accountable.265 This is not to suggest criminal liability should be off
development.”).
262. Hasnas, supra note 232 (manuscript at 1).
263. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971).
264. See Louis Michael Seidman, Points of Intersection: Discontinuities at the Junction of Criminal
Law and the Regulatory State, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 97, 97 (1996) (“Criminal law is
preoccupied by discourse about rights, fault, consent, and separate private and public spheres. Much of
the rest of the law, in contrast, is frankly utilitarian, regulatory, and collective.”). Seidman advises
caution, noting that it would be a “mistake to exaggerate the exceptionalism of the criminal law.” Id. at
140. I do not disagree with this caution, and I find Seidman’s identification of areas of blurring at the
margins compelling. But, as an ideal, criminal law is exceptional, and it is worth keeping that
perspective when contemplating how to improve a particular failure of criminal law, like the
accountability gap generated by corporate prosecutions.
265. See, e.g., Gilchrist, supra note 69, at 45 (identifying particular civil regulations that might be
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the table; where a properly defined crime has been violated, and
where the prosecutor can produce evidence of that violation beyond a
reasonable doubt, she should bring criminal charges. The problem
remains that in many instances of corporate malfeasance, the
substantive law is insufficiently clear or the evidence as to mens rea
at higher levels of the organization is lacking. In these cases, the
public will blame senior management, and the public will be angered
by the absence of accountability. The current trend to push for
enhanced individual prosecutions is bound to fail; but, the imposition
of civil liability might accomplish what the criminal law cannot.
CONCLUSION
Criminal law is distinctive. Perhaps less so than it once was—by
way of overuse—but there is a line between criminal and civil
wrongs. The former contains a moral component—or should contain
a moral component—not necessary to the latter. To the extent this is
less true than it could be, we have lost something and gained nothing.
The continued practice of failing to hold senior management
accountable for high-profile corporate malfeasance is problematic. It
sends a dangerous message of tolerance or even affirmance for their
conduct, and it feeds the narrative that criminal justice applies
differently to the elite. Yet the call for more individual prosecutions
is misguided. Whether through the Yates Memo or otherwise, any
concerted effort to increase the frequency of criminal prosecutions in
the corporate context will be borne largely by relatively low-level
personnel. In this way, these initiatives will do nothing to address the
expressive harm they are designed to counter. Worse, too many of
these prosecutions will be in tension with the rule of law and basic
principles of legality. Prosecutors have strong incentives to prosecute
these cases where they can; if they are not prosecuting these cases, it
is generally because the cases are weak or non-existent.

applied against individuals in the banking context).
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One solution would be to change the substantive criminal law to
capture more conduct with lower mens rea requirements. This would
broaden the criminal law well beyond its traditional contours.
Expanding criminal liability to people who lack mens rea dilutes its
moral core and achieves nothing that could not more readily, and less
problematically, be achieved through civil accountability.
Much of what angers the public about corporate malfeasance is the
accountability gap. People blame management that takes on too much
risk, when the risk is borne almost entirely by the public or by
shareholders.266 Risky drilling operations might improve profits,
helping share price as well as the longevity and pay of senior
management. They might also harm the environment, possibly in a
catastrophic way. The problem is that the latter costs are borne
disproportionately by the environment, the public, and shareholders;
very little of this cost is borne by senior management. Management is
playing with house money, and the accountability gap exacerbates
that fact.
Public blame of management in many of these cases essentially
means blaming them for behavior that created an unjustifiable risk. If
the risk was foreseen and ignored, management appears reckless. If
the risk was unforeseen, but should have been foreseen, management
appears negligent. Both recklessness and negligence are
blameworthy, but they are not blameworthy in the way we condemn
those who intentionally violate a known legal prohibition. This lesser
type of blame should be accounted for, but civil—not criminal—
sanctions represent the best fit.

266. Id. at 24.
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